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Annual Review of Psychology, 1990
Strict theories of reasoning are schoolmarmish in their insistence on rules and structure, but this gives them an advantage when inference is relatively well behaved. In the case of reasoning with deductively valid arguments, Strict theories give a convincing account of the universality of certain inference forms and the productivity of reasoning in ...
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Strict theories of reasoning are schoolmarmish in their insistence on rules and structure, but this gives them an advantage when inference is relatively well behaved. In the case of reasoning with deductively valid arguments, Strict theories give a convincing account of the universality of certain inference forms and the productivity of reasoning in ...
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2005
AbstractThis chapter examines Hume’s theory of empirical reason, and the difference between its rational and its irrational exercise (reasoning reasonably and unreasonably). The theory has five structural levels: (1) reasoning from one matter of fact or real existence to another takes the form of an inference from an impression to an idea; (2 ...
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AbstractThis chapter examines Hume’s theory of empirical reason, and the difference between its rational and its irrational exercise (reasoning reasonably and unreasonably). The theory has five structural levels: (1) reasoning from one matter of fact or real existence to another takes the form of an inference from an impression to an idea; (2 ...
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2001
Abstract Grice begins this chapter by discussing to what extent the notion of variable rationality can be derived from that of flat rationality, and thus from the concept of a rational being alone. He then draws a distinction between ‘explanatory’ (motivating) and ‘justificatory’ (normative) reasons, as well as ‘personal’ reasons that ...
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Abstract Grice begins this chapter by discussing to what extent the notion of variable rationality can be derived from that of flat rationality, and thus from the concept of a rational being alone. He then draws a distinction between ‘explanatory’ (motivating) and ‘justificatory’ (normative) reasons, as well as ‘personal’ reasons that ...
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Philotheos, 2018
This article is published as Vuckovic, M. (2018). Reason’s Reasons: First Principles in the Second-Century Pagan Apologetic. Philotheos, 18(2), 208-232. https://doi.org/10.5840/philotheos201818216. ; The 2-c debate between the Greek Apologists and the pagan Graeco-Roman tradition is multifaceted and complex.
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This article is published as Vuckovic, M. (2018). Reason’s Reasons: First Principles in the Second-Century Pagan Apologetic. Philotheos, 18(2), 208-232. https://doi.org/10.5840/philotheos201818216. ; The 2-c debate between the Greek Apologists and the pagan Graeco-Roman tradition is multifaceted and complex.
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Symposium, 1999
Katherine Mo"ison charges that in my book, Back to Reality, ffailed to make my case for the adoption of a modest realism in postmodem (na"ative) therapy, because f failed to establish the motive behind that movement's adoption of antirealism. Infact, in Back to Reality, I put forth several reasons for therapists of all stripes to favor a modest realism
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Katherine Mo"ison charges that in my book, Back to Reality, ffailed to make my case for the adoption of a modest realism in postmodem (na"ative) therapy, because f failed to establish the motive behind that movement's adoption of antirealism. Infact, in Back to Reality, I put forth several reasons for therapists of all stripes to favor a modest realism
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Giving reasons and given reasons
2021Abstract Derek Parfit, as a leader of the ‘reasons-first’ movement, says that the concept of a reason is fundamental and indefinable. But his concept of a reason differs from most philosophers’. Most philosophers take a reason to be a fact, whereas Parfit says that reasons are given by facts, not that they are facts.
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Episteme, 2015
ABSTRACTHilary Kornblith explores the prospects for reasons eliminationism, the view that reasons ought not to be regarded as being of central importance in epistemology. I reply by conceding that reasons may not be necessary for knowledge, in at least some cases, but I argue that they are nevertheless vitally important in epistemology more broadly ...
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ABSTRACTHilary Kornblith explores the prospects for reasons eliminationism, the view that reasons ought not to be regarded as being of central importance in epistemology. I reply by conceding that reasons may not be necessary for knowledge, in at least some cases, but I argue that they are nevertheless vitally important in epistemology more broadly ...
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2001
Abstract Grice deals with the nature of practical and non‐practical (‘alethic’) reasoning, particularly what may be called imperfect reasoning. It consists of ‘misreasoning’ (the misapplication of good principles of reasoning), ‘incomplete reasoning’ (formally invalid but nonetheless correct inferences due to a missing premise that is ...
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Abstract Grice deals with the nature of practical and non‐practical (‘alethic’) reasoning, particularly what may be called imperfect reasoning. It consists of ‘misreasoning’ (the misapplication of good principles of reasoning), ‘incomplete reasoning’ (formally invalid but nonetheless correct inferences due to a missing premise that is ...
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Reasons, practical reason, and practical reasoning
Ratio, 2004AbstractThe concepts of reasons as supporting elements, of practical reason as a capacity, and of practical reasoning as a process are central in the theory of action. This paper provides a brief account of each. Several kinds of reason for action are distinguished.
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1997
Abstract We have reasons to believe, to act, to feel. We deal in reasons at every turn—for example I have reason to believe you covered for me in an emergency, reason to feel grateful and so reason to thank you in some more or less substantial way.
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Abstract We have reasons to believe, to act, to feel. We deal in reasons at every turn—for example I have reason to believe you covered for me in an emergency, reason to feel grateful and so reason to thank you in some more or less substantial way.
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