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, 2011 Reductionism is a philosophical notion that encompasses a set of ontological, methodological, and epistemological claims about how entities, processes, methods, and knowledge relate to one another across levels of organization and/or scientific domains. Typically, the question is whether such elements at higher levels of organization (i.e., biological)
Malaterre, Christophe
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Parfitian or Buddhist reductionism? Revisiting a debate about personal identity [PDF]
Asian Journal of PhilosophyDerek Parfit influentially defends reductionism about persons, the view that a person’s existence just consists in the existence of a brain and body and the occurrence of a series of physical and mental events.
Javier Hidalgo
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Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2019
AbstractWe address the commentaries on our target article in terms of four major themes. First, we note that virtually all commentators agree that mental disorders are not brain disorders in the common interpretation of these terms, and establish the consensus that explanatory reductionism is not a viable thesis.
Denny Borsboom +2 more
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AbstractWe address the commentaries on our target article in terms of four major themes. First, we note that virtually all commentators agree that mental disorders are not brain disorders in the common interpretation of these terms, and establish the consensus that explanatory reductionism is not a viable thesis.
Denny Borsboom +2 more
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Topics in Cognitive Science, 2015
AbstractDavid Marr's three‐level method for completely understanding a cognitive system and the importance he attaches to the computational level are so familiar as to scarcely need repeating. Fewer seem to recognize that Marr defends his famous method by criticizing the “reductionistic approach.” This sets up a more interesting relationship between ...
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AbstractDavid Marr's three‐level method for completely understanding a cognitive system and the importance he attaches to the computational level are so familiar as to scarcely need repeating. Fewer seem to recognize that Marr defends his famous method by criticizing the “reductionistic approach.” This sets up a more interesting relationship between ...
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From reductionism to reductionism
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2000Neural organization attempts to thwart, at least in part, modern neuroscientists' tendency to focus reductionistically on ever smaller microsystems. But although emphasizing higher levels of systems organization, the authors end up enforcing reductionisms of their own, principally the reduction of their domain to the study of invariable normal ...
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Two Forms of Functional Reductionism in Physics [PDF]
SynthÈseFunctional reductionism characterises inter-theoretic reduction as the recovery of the upper-level behaviour described by the reduced theory in terms of the lower-level reducing theory.
Lorenzo Lorenzetti
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Philosophia Mathematica, 2000
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zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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2004
Abstract We have all, whatever our particular professional academic expertise, from time to time been irritated by those of our colleagues who, coming from another discipline, claim that our discipline X is ‘nothing but’ an example and application of their discipline Y.
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Abstract We have all, whatever our particular professional academic expertise, from time to time been irritated by those of our colleagues who, coming from another discipline, claim that our discipline X is ‘nothing but’ an example and application of their discipline Y.
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LOOKING BEYOND REDUCTIONISM AND ANTI-REDUCTIONISM
Episteme, 2018ABSTRACTUnder which conditions are we epistemically justified to believe that what other people tell us is true? Traditionally, the answer has either been reductionist or anti-reductionist: Either our justification reduces to non-testimonial reasons, or we have a presumptive, though defeasible, right to believe what we are told.
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JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical Association, 1972
E L, Dimmick, A B, Mason
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E L, Dimmick, A B, Mason
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