Results 31 to 40 of about 664,038 (343)
Effect of spatial structure on the evolution of cooperation based on game models [PDF]
Computational Ecology and Software, 2015 To elucidate the mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation has been a core problem in biology, economics and sociology. Evolutionary game theory has proven to be an efficient approach to investigate the problem by using models based on so-called social
Hui Zhang, Meng Gao
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Games, 2018 Evolution of cooperation by reciprocity has been studied using two-player and n-player repeated prisoner’s dilemma games. An interesting feature specific to the n-player case is that players can vary in generosity, or how many defections they ...
Shun Kurokawa +2 more
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Learning in Repeated Games without Repeating the Game [PDF]
, 2004 "This paper extends the convergence result on Bayesian learning in Kalai and Lehrern(1993a, 1993b) to a class of games where players have a payoff function continuous for the product topology. Provided that 1) every player maximizes her expected payoff against her own beliefs, 2) every player updates her beliefs in a Bayesian manner, and 3) prior ...
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Games, 2019 Ransomware is a particular form of cyber-attack in which a victim loses access to either his electronic device or files unless he pays a ransom to criminals. A criminal’s ability to make money from ransomware critically depends on victims believing
Anna Cartwright, Edward Cartwright
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From repeated games to Brownian games [PDF]
Annales de l'Institut Henri Poincare (B) Probability and Statistics, 1999 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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Coopetition in Intermodal Freight Transport Services
Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, 2015 The paper studies the coopetition of the downstream different carriers by providing complementary transport services in intermodal freight transport chain.
Jian Liu, Yinzhen Li, Jun Li
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Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputation [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014 The folk theorem characterizes the (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium payoffs of an undiscounted or discounted infinitely repeated game - with fully informed, patient players - as the feasible individually rational payoffs of the one-shot game. To which extent does the result still hold when every player privately knows his own payoffs ?
Salomon, Antoine, Forges, Françoise
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Unexploitable Games and Unbeatable Strategies
IEEE Access, 2023 Imitation is simple behavior which uses successful actions of others in order to deal with one’s own problems. Because success of imitation generally depends on whether profit of an imitating agent coincides with those of other agents or not, game
Masahiko Ueda
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Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games [PDF]
Econometrica, 1993 In a companion paper [`Learning to play equilibrium', Northwestern University, Evanston (1990)], the authors show that utility maximizing players, holding subjective beliefs about their opponents' strategies in an infinitely repeated game, must converge to a subjective equilibrium. At such an equilibrium, players' forecasts on the actual future play of
Ehud Kalai, Ehud Lehrer
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Repeated signaling games [PDF]
Games and Economic Behavior, 2009 Abstract I analyze a class of repeated signaling games in which the informed player's type is persistent and the history of actions is perfectly observable. In this context, a large class of possibly complex sequences of signals can be supported as the separating equilibrium actions of the “strong type” of the informed player.
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