Results 281 to 290 of about 1,383,828 (332)
Some of the next articles are maybe not open access.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2021
This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study beliefs and their relationship to action and strategy choices in finitely and indefinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games.
Masaki Aoyagi +2 more
semanticscholar +3 more sources
This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study beliefs and their relationship to action and strategy choices in finitely and indefinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games.
Masaki Aoyagi +2 more
semanticscholar +3 more sources
Game Theory, 2018
Repeated interactions arise in several domains such as Economics, Computer Science, and Biology. The theory of repeated games models situations in which a group of agents engage in a strategic interaction over and over.
Jitesh H. Panchal, Me
semanticscholar +3 more sources
Repeated interactions arise in several domains such as Economics, Computer Science, and Biology. The theory of repeated games models situations in which a group of agents engage in a strategic interaction over and over.
Jitesh H. Panchal, Me
semanticscholar +3 more sources
Design of zero-determinant strategies and its application to networked repeated games
Science China Information Sciences, 2023Using the semi-tensor product (STP) of matrices, the profile evolutionary equation (PEE) for repeated finite games is obtained. By PEE, the zero-determinant (ZD) strategies are developed for general finite games.
Daizhan Cheng, Changxi Li
semanticscholar +1 more source
Repeated proximity games [PDF]
International Journal of Game Theory, 1998 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Renault, Jérôme, Tomala, Tristan
openaire +2 more sources
Econometrica, 1985
Subgame perfect equilibria of finitely repeated games are studied. A limit ''folk theorem'' is proved: under certain weak conditions, any feasible and individually rational payoff of the one-shot game can be approximated by the average payoff in a perfect equilibrium of a repeated game with a sufficiently long horizon.
Benoit, Jean-Pierre, Krishna, Vijay
openaire +2 more sources
Subgame perfect equilibria of finitely repeated games are studied. A limit ''folk theorem'' is proved: under certain weak conditions, any feasible and individually rational payoff of the one-shot game can be approximated by the average payoff in a perfect equilibrium of a repeated game with a sufficiently long horizon.
Benoit, Jean-Pierre, Krishna, Vijay
openaire +2 more sources
On Repeated Games with Complete Information
Mathematics of Operations Research, 1986We consider N person repeated games with complete information and standard signalling. We first prove several properties of the sets of feasible payoffs and Nash equilibrium payoffs for the n-stage game and for the λ-discounted game. In the second part we determine the set of equilibrium payoffs for the Prisoner's Dilemma corresponding to the critical
Sylvain Sorin
exaly +2 more sources
Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games [PDF]
Econometrica, 1993 Summary: Perfect equilibria of finitely repeated games may be vulnerable to the possibility of renegotiation among players. We study the limiting properties of the set of payoffs from equilibria that are immune to renegotiation. Our main result is that the limit of the set of payoffs from renegotiation proof equilibria is either a singleton or a ...
Benoit, Jean-Pierre, Krishna, Vijay
openaire +1 more source
Beliefs in Repeated Games: An Experiment
The American Economic ReviewThis paper uses a laboratory experiment to study beliefs and their relationship to action and strategy choices in finitely and indefinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma games.
Masaki Aoyagi +2 more
semanticscholar +1 more source
Econometrica, 2003
Consider a two-player discounted infinitely repeated game. A player's belief is a probability distribution over the opponent's repeated game strategies. This paper shows that, for a large class of repeated games, there are no beliefs that satisfy three conditions, learnability, consistency, and a diversity condition, CS.
openaire +2 more sources
Consider a two-player discounted infinitely repeated game. A player's belief is a probability distribution over the opponent's repeated game strategies. This paper shows that, for a large class of repeated games, there are no beliefs that satisfy three conditions, learnability, consistency, and a diversity condition, CS.
openaire +2 more sources