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Are board games useful for people with dementia? A preliminary study for a non-pharmacological intervention. [PDF]
Guardabassi V +5 more
europepmc +1 more source
Collective artificial intelligence and evolutionary dynamics. [PDF]
Sehwag UM, McAvoy A, Plotkin JB.
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Effectiveness of virtual reality games on the specific sport skills of adolescents. [PDF]
Günar BB, Bavlı Ö.
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SSRN Electronic Journal, 2021
This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study beliefs and their relationship to action and strategy choices in finitely and indefinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games. We find subjects' beliefs about the other player's action are accurate despite some systematic deviations corresponding to early pessimism in the indefinitely repeated game and ...
Aoyagi, Masaki +2 more
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This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study beliefs and their relationship to action and strategy choices in finitely and indefinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games. We find subjects' beliefs about the other player's action are accurate despite some systematic deviations corresponding to early pessimism in the indefinitely repeated game and ...
Aoyagi, Masaki +2 more
openaire +3 more sources
Repeated proximity games [PDF]
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Renault, Jérôme, Tomala, Tristan
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Econometrica, 1985
Subgame perfect equilibria of finitely repeated games are studied. A limit ''folk theorem'' is proved: under certain weak conditions, any feasible and individually rational payoff of the one-shot game can be approximated by the average payoff in a perfect equilibrium of a repeated game with a sufficiently long horizon.
Benoit, Jean-Pierre, Krishna, Vijay
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Subgame perfect equilibria of finitely repeated games are studied. A limit ''folk theorem'' is proved: under certain weak conditions, any feasible and individually rational payoff of the one-shot game can be approximated by the average payoff in a perfect equilibrium of a repeated game with a sufficiently long horizon.
Benoit, Jean-Pierre, Krishna, Vijay
openaire +3 more sources
Beliefs in Repeated Games [PDF]
Consider a two-player discounted infinitely repeated game. A player's belief is a probability distribution over the opponent's repeated game strategies. This paper shows that, for a large class of repeated games, there are no beliefs that satisfy three conditions, learnability, consistency, and a diversity condition, CS.
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