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Modeling Strategic Behavior, 2018
Games where a particular smaller game (the stage game) is repeated:-a finite number of times-infinitely many times First example of a stage game: The Prisoner's dilemma Player 2 confess don't confess Player 1 confess 2.2 10.0 don't confess 0.10 6 ...
G. Mailath
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Games where a particular smaller game (the stage game) is repeated:-a finite number of times-infinitely many times First example of a stage game: The Prisoner's dilemma Player 2 confess don't confess Player 1 confess 2.2 10.0 don't confess 0.10 6 ...
G. Mailath
semanticscholar +2 more sources
Econometrica, 1985
Subgame perfect equilibria of finitely repeated games are studied. A limit ''folk theorem'' is proved: under certain weak conditions, any feasible and individually rational payoff of the one-shot game can be approximated by the average payoff in a perfect equilibrium of a repeated game with a sufficiently long horizon.
Benoit, Jean-Pierre, Krishna, Vijay
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Subgame perfect equilibria of finitely repeated games are studied. A limit ''folk theorem'' is proved: under certain weak conditions, any feasible and individually rational payoff of the one-shot game can be approximated by the average payoff in a perfect equilibrium of a repeated game with a sufficiently long horizon.
Benoit, Jean-Pierre, Krishna, Vijay
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International Journal of Game Theory, 1998
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Renault, Jérôme, Tomala, Tristan
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zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Renault, Jérôme, Tomala, Tristan
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