Results 331 to 340 of about 1,635,028 (357)
Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games [PDF]
Econometrica, 1993 Summary: Perfect equilibria of finitely repeated games may be vulnerable to the possibility of renegotiation among players. We study the limiting properties of the set of payoffs from equilibria that are immune to renegotiation. Our main result is that the limit of the set of payoffs from renegotiation proof equilibria is either a singleton or a ...
Benoit, Jean-Pierre, Krishna, Vijay
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Journal of Applied Probability, 1979
A matrix game is played repeatedly, with the actions taken at each stage determining both a reward paid to Player I and the probability of continuing to the next stage. An infinite history of play determines a sequence (Rn ) of such rewards, to which we assign the payoff lim supn (R 1 + · ·· + Rn ).
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A matrix game is played repeatedly, with the actions taken at each stage determining both a reward paid to Player I and the probability of continuing to the next stage. An infinite history of play determines a sequence (Rn ) of such rewards, to which we assign the payoff lim supn (R 1 + · ·· + Rn ).
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Cumbersome coordination in repeated games [PDF]
International Journal of Game Theory, 2000 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Horst Raff, David Schmidt
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SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 1988
Finite extensive form games in which each player's information set may contain nodes lying on a single directed path are considered. The existence of a Nash equilibrium point in randomized strategies is shown. Some examples are considered.
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Finite extensive form games in which each player's information set may contain nodes lying on a single directed path are considered. The existence of a Nash equilibrium point in randomized strategies is shown. Some examples are considered.
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Modeling Strategic Behavior, 2018
Games where a particular smaller game (the stage game) is repeated:-a finite number of times-infinitely many times First example of a stage game: The Prisoner's dilemma Player 2 confess don't confess Player 1 confess 2.2 10.0 don't confess 0.10 6 ...
G. Mailath
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Games where a particular smaller game (the stage game) is repeated:-a finite number of times-infinitely many times First example of a stage game: The Prisoner's dilemma Player 2 confess don't confess Player 1 confess 2.2 10.0 don't confess 0.10 6 ...
G. Mailath
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2015
In this chapter repeated and dynamic games will be discussed in which the players know the strategy sets and payoff functions of all players, that is, the game has complete information. It is also assumed that at each time period each player knows the complete history of the game which consists of the past strategy selections and corresponding payoff ...
Ferenc Szidarovszky, Akio Matsumoto
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In this chapter repeated and dynamic games will be discussed in which the players know the strategy sets and payoff functions of all players, that is, the game has complete information. It is also assumed that at each time period each player knows the complete history of the game which consists of the past strategy selections and corresponding payoff ...
Ferenc Szidarovszky, Akio Matsumoto
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Continuous Time Repeated Games
International Economic Review, 1993Summary: We develop a model of strategic behaviour in continuous time games of complete information, which includes conventional repeated games in discrete time as a special case. The model developed here admits a very large class of strategies, that allows one to extend the repeated game model to continuous time. The set of equilibria in this game may
Bergin, James, MacLeod, W Bentley
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Optimal Machine Strategies to Commit to in Two-Person Repeated Games
AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015The problem of computing optimal strategy to commit to in various games has attracted intense research interests and has important real-world applications such as security (attacker-defender) games. In this paper, we consider the problem of computing
Song Zuo, Pingzhong Tang
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Repeated Play of Potential Games
Cybernetics and Systems Analysis, 2002The authors analyze the convergence of the adjustment rules of players in the repetitive play in the potential games developed by \textit{D. Monderer} and \textit{L. S. Shapley} [Games Econ. Behav. 14, 124--143 (1996; Zbl 0862.90137)] to Nash equilibrium.
Ermoliev, Y.M., Flam, S.D.
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