Results 141 to 150 of about 2,502 (178)
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2021
Abstract In this chapter some initial arguments for representationalism are considered and dismissed. Naturalist representationalism is distinguished from phenomenal intentionalism and shown to be implausible. Appeals to the ‘transparency’ of experience are considered and shown to be problematic.
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Abstract In this chapter some initial arguments for representationalism are considered and dismissed. Naturalist representationalism is distinguished from phenomenal intentionalism and shown to be implausible. Appeals to the ‘transparency’ of experience are considered and shown to be problematic.
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Representationism, Realism And The Redundancy Of ‘Mentalese’
Theory & Psychology, 1991Representationism as a theory of knowledge cannot avoid collapsing into solipsism, cannot distinguish between true and false beliefs without contradicting its own basic premise and cannot give any objective ground for inference. Fodor's postulated `mentalese' is shown to suffer these defects; further, its nativism cannot bridge the supposed gap between
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Representationalism and Antirepresentationalism
1998The notions of representationalism and antirepresentationalism are introduced and used in contemporary philosophical discussions by Richard Rorty to describe his and the neopragmatists' attitude toward traditional problems of epistemology. Rorty means that the history of philosophy shows that there are no final answers to the traditional questions ...
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Rosenthal's Representationalism
Balkan Journal of PhilosophyIn this paper I discuss Rosenthal’s theory of consciousness. Being in a conscious state, according to his view, consists in having an appropriate higher order mental representation – a higher order thought (HOT) about a lower order non-conscious state.
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