Results 21 to 30 of about 59,213 (328)
Borderline Experiences One Cannot Undergo
Crítica, 2018 Representationalism maintains that the phenomenal character of an experience is fully determined by its intentional content. Representationalism is a very attractive theory in the project of naturalizing consciousness, on the assumption that the ...
Miguel Ángel Sebastián
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What Do Animals See? Intentionality, Objects and Kantian Nonconceptualism [PDF]
, 2020 This article addresses three questions concerning Kant’s views on non-rational animals: do they intuit spatio-temporal particulars, do they perceive objects, and do they have intentional states?
Golob, Sacha
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General and specific consciousness: a first-order representationalist approach
Frontiers in Psychology, 2013 It is widely acknowledged that a complete theory of consciousness should explain general consciousness (what makes a state conscious at all) and specific consciousness (what gives a conscious state its particular phenomenal quality).
Neil eMehta +2 more
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Is the sense-data theory a representationalist theory? [PDF]
, 2014 Is the sense-data theory, otherwise known as indirect realism, a form of representationalism? This question has been underexplored in the extant literature, and to the extent that there is discussion, contemporary authors disagree.
Macpherson, Fiona
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Is there introspective evidence for phenomenal intentionality? [PDF]
, 2016 The so-called transparency of experience (TE) is the intuition that, in introspecting one’s own experience, one is only aware of certain properties (like colors, shapes, etc.) as features of (apparently) mind-independent objects.
Bordini, Davide
core +3 more sources
A representationalist reading of Kantian intuitions [PDF]
, 2021 There are passages in Kant’s writings according to which empirical intuitions have to be (a) singular, (b) object-dependent, and (c) immediate. It has also been argued that empirical intuitions (d) are not truth-apt, and (e) need to provide the subject ...
Shahmoradi, Ayoob
core
Representationalism and Ambiguous Figures
Phenomenology and Mind, 2016 The phenomenon of ambiguous figures raises difficulties for the theories of the content of our visual experience that hold that its phenomenal character is identical to its representational content and wholly nonconceptual.
Arianna Uggé
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Descartes’ idea and the representations of things [PDF]
Filozofija i Društvo, 2011 On the basis of the analysis of relevant passages from Descartes’ writings, the article shows that Descartes’ ideas represent things in mind, but that he is not a representationalist in a Malebranchean sense: in Descartes, represented object is ...
Milidrag Predrag
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Two open questions in the reformist agenda of the philosophy of cognitive science
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, 2023 In this paper we carve out a reformist agenda within the debate on the foundations of cognitive science, incorporating some important ideas from the 4E cognition literature into the computational-representational framework.
Aurora Alegiani +2 more
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Naive realism, representationalism, and the rationalizing role of visual perception
Philosophical Issues, 2020 Suppose that I’m charged with helping a child learn his colours. The child has a number of uniformly coloured cubes, and we play the ‘which colour?’ game.
C. French
semanticscholar +1 more source