Cores of games with restricted cooperation [PDF]
Games with restricted cooperation are cooperativeN-person games with sidepayments, where the collection of feasible coalitions need not comprise all subsets of players and thus is restricted. We study balanced and completely balanced games in this context and derive the corresponding core theorems from a sandwich theorem for set functions within the ...
U Faigle
exaly +2 more sources
Despotism promotes dyadic cooperation through enhanced interdependencies in non-human primate societies [PDF]
Cooperation is the cornerstone of human societies, and its emergence is firmly linked to enhanced tolerance and egalitarianism. However, evidence of profuse cooperation in less tolerant and despotic societies challenges this predominant view.
Debottam Bhattacharjee +23 more
doaj +2 more sources
Fuzzy restrictions and an application to cooperative games with restricted cooperation
The concept of restriction, which is an extension of that of interior operator, was introduced to model limited cooperation in cooperative game theory. In this paper, a fuzzy version of restrictions is presented. We show that these new operators, called fuzzy restrictions, can be characterized by the transitivity of the fuzzy dependence relations that ...
JOSÉ M Gallardo, A Jiménez-Losada
exaly +5 more sources
Ensuring the boundedness of the core of games with restricted cooperation [PDF]
The core of a cooperative game on a set of players $N$ is one of the most popular concept of solution. When cooperation is restricted (feasible coalitions form a subcollection $\cF$ of $2^N$), the core may become unbounded, which makes it usage questionable in practice.
Michel Grabisch, Grabisch Michel
exaly +7 more sources
Characterization of a value for games under restricted cooperation
AbstractThe object of this paper is to study restricted cooperative games, that is, cooperative games for which the worth of some coalitions is unknown. We consider a value for these restricted cooperative games whose definition is based on the Harsanyi’s dividends approach, and can therefore be seen as an extension of the Shapley value.
JOSÉ M Zarzuelo
exaly +3 more sources
Restricted connections among distinguished players support cooperation [PDF]
We study the evolution of cooperation within the spatial prisoner's dilemma game on a square lattice where a fraction of players $μ$ can spread their strategy more easily than the rest due to a predetermined larger teaching capability. In addition, players characterized with the larger teaching capability are allowed to temporarily link with distant ...
Matjaz Perc +2 more
exaly +4 more sources
The essential coalitions index in games with restricted cooperation
Abstract We propose a new power index, which we call the essential coalitions index . The index is defined on the class of simple games with cooperation restricted by a cooperation index, which encompasses other restriction models, including Myerson’s communication games. In
exaly +3 more sources
A Value for Graph-Restricted Games with Middlemen on Edges
In a cooperative game with a communication structure, a graph describes the communication possibilities of the players, which are represented by the nodes.
Antonio C. Alarcón +2 more
doaj +1 more source
Properties of Solutions for Games on Union-Closed Systems
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game.
Rene van den Brink +2 more
doaj +1 more source
Cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma: an experimental comparison between pure and mixed strategies [PDF]
Cooperation is—despite not being predicted by game theory—a widely documented aspect of human behaviour in Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) situations. This article presents a comparison between subjects restricted to playing pure strategies and subjects allowed ...
Leonie Heuer, Andreas Orland
doaj +1 more source

