Results 11 to 20 of about 356 (117)

Uncovering In-DRAM RowHammer Protection Mechanisms:A New Methodology, Custom RowHammer Patterns, and Implications [PDF]

MICRO-54: 54th Annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture, 2021
The RowHammer vulnerability in DRAM is a critical threat to system security. To protect against RowHammer, vendors commit to security-through-obscurity: modern DRAM chips rely on undocumented, proprietary, on-die mitigations, commonly known as Target Row Refresh (TRR).
Hasan Hassan, Yahya Can Tugrul, Jeremie S. Kim, Victor van der Veen, Kaveh Razavi, Onur Mutlu   +5 more
core   +6 more sources

Software-only Rowhammer Attacks and Countermeasures

, 2021
Rowhammer is a hardware vulnerability in DRAM memory, where repeated access to memory (i.e., hammer rows) can induce bit flips in neighboring memory locations (i.e., victim rows). Being a hardware vulnerability, rowhammer bypasses all of the system memory protection, allowing adversaries to compromise the integrity and confidentiality of data.
Zhang, Zhi
openaire   +5 more sources

Another Flip in the Wall of Rowhammer Defenses [PDF]

2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), 2018
The Rowhammer bug allows unauthorized modification of bits in DRAM cells from unprivileged software, enabling powerful privilege-escalation attacks. Sophisticated Rowhammer countermeasures have been presented, aiming at mitigating the Rowhammer bug or its exploitation.
Daniel Gruss, Moritz Lipp, Michael Schwarz 0001, Daniel Genkin, Jonas Juffinger, Sioli O'Connell, Wolfgang Schoechl, Yuval Yarom   +7 more
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Drammer [PDF]

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2016
Recent work shows that the Rowhammer hardware bug can be used to craft powerful attacks and completely subvert a system. However, existing e orts either describe probabilistic (and thus unreliable) attacks or rely on special (and often unavailable) memory management features to place victim objects in vulnerable physical memory locations.
Victor van der Veen, Yanick Fratantonio, Martina Lindorfer, Daniel Gruss, Clémentine Maurice, Giovanni Vigna, Herbert Bos, Kaveh Razavi, Cristiano Giuffrida   +8 more
openaire   +3 more sources

Revisiting Rowhammer Attacks in Embedded Systems

2019 14th International Conference on Design & Technology of Integrated Systems In Nanoscale Era (DTIS), 2019
As the cell density of DRAM modules keeps increasing to guarantee the growing demand for memory capacity in modern computer and embedded system, the electromagnetic interference between memory cells increase significantly, leading to security vulnerabilities that can be exploited. In particular, the widespread Rowhammer vulnerability has been proven to
Lidia Pocero Fraile, Apostolos P. Fournaris, Odysseas G. Koufopavlou   +2 more
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LightRoAD: Lightweight Rowhammer Attack Detector

2021 IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI), 2021
Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM)-based systems are widely used in mobile and portable applications where low-cost and high-storage memory capability are required. However, such systems are prone to attacks. A latent threat to DRAM-based system security is the so-called Rowhammer attacks. By repeatedly accessing memory, an attacker is able to perform
Mottaqiallah Taouil, Cezar Reinbrecht, Said Hamdioui, Johanna Sepúlveda   +3 more
openaire   +4 more sources

Flipper: Rowhammer on Steroids

Proceedings of the Microarchitecture Security Conference
The density of memory cells in modern DRAM is so high that frequently accessing a memory row can flip bits in nearby rows. That effect is called Rowhammer, and an attacker can exploit this phenomenon to flip bits by rapidly accessing the contents of nearby memory rows.
Martin Heckel, Florian Adamsky
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A Rowhammer Reproduction Study Using the Blacksmith Fuzzer

, 2023
Rowhammer is a hardware vulnerability that can be exploited to induce bit flips in dynamic random access memory (DRAM), compromising the security of a computer system. Multiple ways of exploiting Rowhammer have been shown and even in the presence of mitigations such as target row refresh (TRR), DRAM modules remain partially vulnerable. In this paper,
Lukas Gerlach 0001, Fabian Thomas, Robert Pietsch, Michael Schwarz 0001   +3 more
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SoK: Rowhammer on Commodity Operating Systems

Proceedings of the 19th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Rowhammer has drawn much attention from both academia and industry in the past years as rowhammer exploitation poses severe consequences to system security. Since the first comprehensive study of rowhammer in 2014, a number of rowhammer attacks have been demonstrated against dynamic random access memory (DRAM)-based commodity systems to break software ...
Zhi Zhang 0001, Decheng Chen, Jiahao Qi, Yueqiang Cheng, Shijie Jiang, Yiyang Lin, Yansong Gao 0001, Surya Nepal, Yi Zou, Jiliang Zhang 0002, Yang Xiang 0001   +10 more
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Scalable and Configurable Tracking for Any Rowhammer Threshold

CoRR, 2023
The Rowhammer vulnerability continues to get worse, with the Rowhammer Threshold (TRH) reducing from 139K activations to 4.8K activations over the last decade. Typical Rowhammer mitigations rely on tracking aggressor rows. The number of possible aggressors increases with lowering thresholds, making it difficult to reliably track such rows in a storage ...
Anish Saxena, Moinuddin K. Qureshi
openaire   +3 more sources