Results 171 to 180 of about 1,225 (207)
How much can taxes help selfish routing?
Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 2006 We study economic incentives for influencing selfish behavior in networks. We consider a model of selfish routing in which the latency experienced by network traffic on an edge of the network is a function of the edge congestion, and network users are ...
Richard Cole +2 more
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Algorithmica, 2001
We study the problem of routing traffic through a congested network. We focus on the simplest case of a network consisting of m parallel links. We assume a collection of n network users; each user employs a mixed strategy, which is a probability distribution over links, to control the shipping of its own assigned traffic. Given a capacity for each link
Mavronicolas, Marios +3 more
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We study the problem of routing traffic through a congested network. We focus on the simplest case of a network consisting of m parallel links. We assume a collection of n network users; each user employs a mixed strategy, which is a probability distribution over links, to control the shipping of its own assigned traffic. Given a capacity for each link
Mavronicolas, Marios +3 more
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ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 2011
We present a model for routing games in which edge delay functions are uncertain and users are risk-averse. We investigate how the uncertainty and risk-aversion transform the classical theory on routing games, including equilibria existence, characterization and price of anarchy.
Evdokia Nikolova +1 more
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We present a model for routing games in which edge delay functions are uncertain and users are risk-averse. We investigate how the uncertainty and risk-aversion transform the classical theory on routing games, including equilibria existence, characterization and price of anarchy.
Evdokia Nikolova +1 more
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Mathematics of Operations Research, 2018
Summary: We consider a nonatomic selfish routing model with independent stochastic travel times for each edge, represented by mean and variance latency functions that depend on edge flows. This model can apply to traffic in the Internet or in a road network. Variability negatively impacts packets or drivers by introducing jitter in transmission delays,
Thanasis Lianeas +2 more
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Summary: We consider a nonatomic selfish routing model with independent stochastic travel times for each edge, represented by mean and variance latency functions that depend on edge flows. This model can apply to traffic in the Internet or in a road network. Variability negatively impacts packets or drivers by introducing jitter in transmission delays,
Thanasis Lianeas +2 more
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SELFISH ROUTING IN THE PRESENCE OF NETWORK UNCERTAINTY
Parallel Processing Letters, 2009We study the problem of selfish routing in the presence of incomplete network information. Our model consists of a number of users who wish to route their traffic on a network of m parallel links with the objective of minimizing their latency. However, in doing so, they face the challenge of lack of precise information on the capacity of the network ...
Georgiou, Chryssis +5 more
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Atomic Selfish Routing in Networks
2005In this survey we present some recent advances in the literature of atomic (mainly network) congestion games. The algorithmic questions that we are interested in have to do with the existence of pure Nash equilibria, the efficiency of their construction when they exist, as well as the gap of the best/worst (mixed in general) Nash equilibria from the ...
Spyros C. Kontogiannis, Paul G. Spirakis
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Altruism, selfishness, and spite in traffic routing
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2008In this paper, we study the price of anarchy of traffic routing, under the assumption that users are partially altruistic or spiteful. We model such behavior by positing that the "cost" perceived by a user is a linear combination of the actual latency of the route chosen (selfish component), and the increase in latency the user causes for others ...
Po-An Chen, David Kempe 0001
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2006
One of the most widely used solution concepts for strategic games is the concept of Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium is a state in which no player can improve its objective by unilaterally changing its strategy. A Nash equilibrium is called pure if all players choose a pure strategy, and mixed if players choose probability distributions over ...
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One of the most widely used solution concepts for strategic games is the concept of Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium is a state in which no player can improve its objective by unilaterally changing its strategy. A Nash equilibrium is called pure if all players choose a pure strategy, and mixed if players choose probability distributions over ...
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Demand-Driven Line Planning with Selfish Routing [PDF]
, 2018 Bus rapid transit systems in developing and newly industrialized countries are often operated at the limits of passenger capacity. In particular, demand during morning and afternoon peaks is hardly or even not covered with available line plans.
Renken, Malte +4 more
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How to route and tax selfish unsplittable traffic
Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures, 2004We study the problem of assigning unsplittable traffic to a set of m links so to minimize the maximum link congestion (i.e., the makespan). We consider the case of selfish agents owning pieces of the traffic. In particular, we introduce a variant of the model by Koutsopias and Papadimitriou [1999] in which owners of the traffic cannot directly choose ...
AULETTA, Vincenzo +3 more
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