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Threat Power in Sequential Games [PDF]

International Studies Quarterly, 1984
The analysis of 2 × 2 ordinal games, in which both players can sequentially move and countermove after an initial outcome is chosen, is extended to repeated play of these games in which one player has ‘threat power’. This power enables this player to threaten the other player with a mutually disadvantageous outcome in order to deter certain moves in ...
Brams, Steven J., Hessel, Marek P.
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Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games: A Comment

Econometrica, 2010
Recursive procedures which are based on iterating on the best response mapping have difficulties converging to all equilibria in multi-player games. We illustrate these difficulties by revisiting the asymptotic properties of the iterative nested pseudo maximum likelihood method for estimating dynamic games introduced by Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007 ...
Pesendorfer, Martin, Schmidt-Dengler, Philipp   +1 more
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Sequential games with random priority

Sequential Analysis, 1990
The paper deals with a class of two-person zero-sum sequential games related to a partial observation of random variables X1,X2,...,XN by the players. Each player, based on some indirect information, selects a moment t, l≤t≤N. In this way he communicates that he would like to accept an unknown realization xt of Xt.
T. Radzik, K. Szajowski
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Staying power in sequential games

Theory and Decision, 1983
Staying power is the ability of a player to hold off choosing a strategy in a two-person game until the other player has selected his, after which the players are assumed to be able to move and countermove sequentially to ensure their best possible outcomes before the process cycles back to the initial outcome and then repeats itself (‘rational ...
Brams, Steven J., Hessel, Marek P.
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Implementation Through Sequential Unanimity Games

1994
In this chapter we study the implementation of social decision rules in a particular family of economic environments and by means of a particular type of sequential voting process. In these problems there are two agents, each of whom receives a real-valued piece of information.
Green, Jerry, Laffont, Jean-Jacques
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Collusion Detection in Sequential Games

2012
Collusion is the deliberate cooperation of two or more parties to the detriment of others. While this behaviour can be highly profitable for colluders (for example, in auctions and online games), it is considered illegal and unfair in many sequential decision-making domains and presents many challenging problems in these systems.
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Sequential Games

2023
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Strategies in sequential stochastic games

1984
Bibliography: p. 54-56.
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The WHO fungal priority pathogens list as a game-changer

Nature Reviews Microbiology, 2023
Matthew C Fisher, David W Denning
exaly  

The CDK4/6 inhibitor revolution — a game-changing era for breast cancer treatment

Nature Reviews Clinical Oncology, 2023
Nicholas Turner
exaly