Results 121 to 130 of about 60,439 (314)
Sports CEOs and Corporate Innovation
European Financial Management, EarlyView.ABSTRACT Using a hand‐collected data set, we find that firms led by CEOs who were student‐athletes in college exhibit significantly superior innovation outcomes, as measured by patent numbers, citation counts, and the economic value of patents. Evidence from CEO turnover analysis supports a CEO imprinting interpretation.
Jaideep Chowdhury +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Moral Hazard in Sequential Teams [PDF]
This paper considers a team in which production takes place sequentially and in which agents observe the actions taken by previous agents. We show that for such teams sharing rules exist which are balanced and induce efficient production as the unique ...
Roland Strausz
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Gender, Work &Organization, EarlyView.ABSTRACT This article seeks to disrupt the undertheorization of Colored women's leadership experiences in gender transformation research. We refer specifically to women who self‐identify as Colored South African and consider themselves to be part of the South African Colored community.
Trudy Rhoda Forbay, Peliwe Pelisa Mnguni
wiley +1 more source
Free Ride: The Senate Health Bill's Approach to "Employer Responsibility" Means Some Large Employers Get to Take It Easy [PDF]
, 2009 Leaders in both the House and the Senate have committed to "shared responsibility" as a basic principle of health care reform, meaning that the costs of health care coverage are shared by individuals, businesses, and the public sector.
Shawn Fremstad
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Profit Sharing, Teams, and Earnings
Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, EarlyView.ABSTRACT This paper examines the impact of two team arrangements on the association between profit sharing and workers' earnings. In non‐interconnected teams individuals work on a single team, whereas in interconnected teams some employees work on several teams.
Marco A. Barrenechea‐Méndez +1 more
wiley +1 more source
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, EarlyView.Abstract This article analyses the European Commission's (Commission) capacity to manage and deepen the EU–UK relationship post the implementation of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) and its efforts to expand its competencies within the framework, through the use of the principal–agent theory.
David Moloney, Simon Usherwood
wiley +1 more source
The Evolution of Strong Reciprocity [PDF]
A number of outstanding puzzles in economics may be resolved by recognizing that where members of a group benefit from mutual adherence to a social norm, agents may obey the norm and punish its violators, even when this behavior cannot be motivated by ...
Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles
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Incentive and Signaling Effects of Bonus Payments: An Experiment in a Company
Journal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.ABSTRACT Economists and management scholars have argued that the scope of incentives to increase cooperation in organizations is limited as their use may signal the prevalence of free‐riding among employees. This paper tests this hypothesis with an artefactual field experiment that assigns managers and employees from a large company to stylized roles ...
Marvin Deversi, Lisa Spantig
wiley +1 more source
Optimally Empty Promises and Endogenous Supervision [PDF]
We study optimal contracting in team settings, featuring stylized aspects of production environments with complex tasks. Agents have many opportunities to shirk, task-level monitoring is needed to provide useful incentives, and because it is difficult to
David A. Miller, Kareen Rozen
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External Recruitment as an incentive Device [PDF]
External recruitment has often been viewed as a necessary evil in that it trades off the need for outside talents with the incentives of inside workers.
Kong-Pin Chen
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