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The geometry of Black's single peakedness and related conditions [PDF]
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Fabrice Valognes, Donald G Saari
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Single-peakedness and semantic dimensions of preferences [PDF]
Among the possible solutions to the paradoxes of collective preferences, single-peakedness is significant because it has been associated to a suggestive conceptual interpretation: a single-peaked preference profile entails that, although individuals may disagree on which option is the best, they conceptualize the choice along a shared unique dimension,
Porello, Daniele
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Testing the single-peakedness of other-regarding preferences [PDF]
We test an implication that is common to all prominent theories of outcome-based other-regarding preferences: the ordinal preference ranking of an agent over a finite number of alternatives lying on any straight line in the space of material payoffs to oneself and some other agent must be single-peaked or single-plateaued.
Levati, Maria Vittoria +2 more
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Approximate Single-Peakedness in Large Elections
2020 IEEE International Conference on Knowledge Graph (ICKG), 2020Single-peaked preferences are a natural way to avoid paradoxes and impossibility theorems in social choice and have recently been involved in the study of various computational aspects of social choice. Since strict single-peakedness is hard to achieve in practice, approximate single-peakedness appears more appropriate and is gaining popularity.
Xiaoming Sun +2 more
exaly +2 more sources
Condorcet domains satisfying Arrow’s single-peakedness
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2019Condorcet paradox displays voters' preferences such that majority rule leads to an intransitive group preference. An approach to tackle this difficulty arises by restraining the set of preferences available to the voters. Condorcet domains are sets of linear orders with the property that, whenever the preferences of all voters belong to this set, the ...
Arkadii Slinko
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Single-peakedness and strategy-proofness of generalized median voter schemes [PDF]
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Dolors Berga
exaly +3 more sources
The plurality majority converse under single peakedness
Social Choice and Welfare, 1996zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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