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Skeptical Theism, God, and Evidence

2022
Skeptical theism is an important position (or set of positions) that—if true—has significant implications in the philosophy of religion regarding the epistemic status of theism and atheism. Broadly speaking, skeptical theists are theists who are skeptical about the ability of humans to discern, by certain methods, the probability of God permitting ...
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Skeptical Theism

Abstract The main goal of this chapter is to show that the sort of skeptical theism defended by philosophers like Michael Bergmann and Daniel Howard-Snyder cannot be used to refute the two arguments from evil defended in this book. After explaining why skeptical theism of the sort in question seriously challenges arguments from the ...
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Skeptical theism, moral skepticism, and epistemic propriety

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2016
Respondents to the argument from evil who follow Michael Bergmann’s development of skeptical theism hold that our failure to determine God’s reasons for permitting evil does not disconfirm theism (i.e. render theism less probable on the evidence of evil than it would be if merely evaluated against our background knowledge) at all.
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Does Skeptical Theism Lead to Moral Skepticism?

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2006
beings suffering for no apparent good reason. Perhaps the most common criticism of the evidential argument comes from the camp of skeptical theism, whose lot includes William Alston, Alvin Plantinga, and Stephen Wykstra. According to skeptical theism the limits of human knowledge concerning the realm of goods, evils, and the connections between values,
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The Nature of Skeptical Theism

Philosophia Christi, 2019
Skeptical theism is a popular response to arguments from evil. Recently, Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne, and Yoaav Isaacs have argued that the theses that ground skeptical theism are either false or limited in scope. In this article, I show that their objections rest on dubious assumptions about the nature of skeptical theism.
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Skeptical theism and value judgments

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2012
One of the most prominent objections to skeptical theism in recent literature is that the skeptical theist is forced to deny our competency in making judgments about the all-things-considered value of any natural event. Some skeptical theists accept that their view has this implication, but argue that it is not problematic. I think that there is reason
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Skeptical Theism and God’s Commands

Sophia, 2007
According to Michael Almeida and Graham Oppy, adherents of skeptical theism will find their sense of moral obligation undermined in a potentially ‘appalling’ way. Michael Bergmann and Michael Rea disagree, claiming that God’s commands provide skeptical theists with a source of moral obligation that withstands the skepticism in skeptical theism. I argue
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Skeptical theism and moral obligation

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2008
Skeptical theism claims that the probability of a perfect God’s existence isn’t at all reduced by our failure to see how such a God could allow the horrific suffering that occurs in our world. Given our finite grasp of the realm of value, skeptical theists argue, it shouldn’t surprise us that we fail to see the reasons that justify God in allowing such
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A Refutation of Skeptical Theism

Sophia, 2012
Skeptical theists argue that no seemingly unjustified evil (SUE) could ever lower the probability of God's existence at all. Why? Because God might have justifying reasons for allowing such evils (JuffREs) that are undetectable. However, skeptical theists are unclear regarding whether or not God's existence is relevant to the existence of JuffREs, and ...
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