Results 11 to 20 of about 125 (113)

Skeptical Theism and Moral Skepticism [PDF]

open access: yesArs Disputandi, 2004
Skeptical theists purport to undermine evidential arguments from evil by appealing to the fact that our knowledge of goods, evils, and their interconnections is significantly limited. Michael J. Almeida and Graham Oppy have recently argued that skeptical theism is unacceptable because it results in a form of moral skepticism which rejects inferences ...
Trakakis, Nick, Nagasawa, Yujin
openaire   +1 more source

THE DE JURE OBJECTION AGAINST BELIEF IN MIRACLES

open access: yesManuscrito, 2021
Alvin Plantinga (1993a, 1993b, 2000) argues that de jure objections to theism depend on de facto objections: in order to say that belief in God is not warranted, one should first assume that this belief is false. Assuming Plantinga’s epistemology and his
GESIEL DA SILVA
doaj   +1 more source

Is There a Right to Hope That God Exists? Evil and the Principle of Non-Parity

open access: yesReligions, 2022
In this paper, I respond to James Sterba’s recent book ‘Is a Good God Logically Possible?’ I show that Sterba concludes that God is not logically possible by ignoring three important issues: (a) the different functions of leeway indeterminism (and the ...
Jacqueline Mariña
doaj   +1 more source

In Answer to the Pauline Principle: Consent, Logical Constraints, and Free Will

open access: yesReligions, 2022
James Sterba uses the Pauline Principle to argue that the occurrence of significant, horrendous evils is logically incompatible with the existence of a good God.
Marilie Coetsee
doaj   +1 more source

A Dilemma for Sterba

open access: yesReligions, 2022
James Sterba argues that a good God is not logically possible. He argues that what he calls the Pauline Principle, which says that we should never do evil that good may come of it, implies that a good God would prevent horrendous evil consequences of ...
Bruce Russell
doaj   +1 more source

CORNEA under magnifier: an assessment of usability of CORNEA against William Rowe’s evidential argument from gratuitous evil [PDF]

open access: yesحکمت معاصر, 2018
By introducing evidential argument, William Rowe opened a new chapter in discussions about problem of evil. Rowe’s first formulation of the problem based on the idea that because “it appears” that some evils in the world are gratuitous then they are ...
mohammad ali mirbagheri   +2 more
doaj   +1 more source

A New Interpretation of the Theory of Evolution and its Compatibility with Intelligent Design Based on Peter Van Inwagen’s View [PDF]

open access: yesComparative Theology, 2018
This study aims to present a new interpretation of the theory of evolution and its compatibility with intelligent design based on special views of Peter van Inwagen.
Farah Ramin, Tayebe Gholami
doaj   +1 more source

Skeptical Theism, Free Will Skepticism and Atheism: Pondering the Scope of Moral Paralysis

open access: yesCuestiones Teológicas, 2019
In this paper, I aim to show that Skeptical Theism (ST) implies the rejection of Free Will Skepticism (FWS). This is so because ST holds the so-called evidential argument from evil against theism. This argument presupposes free will (as a hidden premise),
Rafael Miranda-Rojas
doaj   +1 more source

An Examination and Critique of Paul Draper’s View on the Problem of Evil [PDF]

open access: yesPizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī
Paul Draper is one of the most sophisticated contemporary defenders of the evidential argument from evil. In his seminal 1989 paper “Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists,” he argues that the observed distribution and intensity of ...
Seyyed Mohsen Hashemi   +1 more
doaj   +1 more source

Opaque Theism and Divine Testimony

open access: yesTheoLogica
A much-discussed objection to skeptical theism is that skeptical theism implies that divine testimony cannot provide us with knowledge. Here I argue that it is not skeptical theism that raises doubts about the trustworthiness of divine testimony; rather,
Erik Wielenberg
doaj   +1 more source

Home - About - Disclaimer - Privacy