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Pairwise Preferences in the Stable Marriage Problem [PDF]
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 2021 We study the classical, two-sided stable marriage problem under pairwise preferences. In the most general setting, agents are allowed to express their preferences as comparisons of any two of their edges, and they also have the right to declare a draw or even withdraw from such a comparison.
Agnes Cseh
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Communications of the ACM, 1971
The original work of Gale and Shapley on an assignment method using the stable marriage criterion has been extended to find all the stable marriage assignments. The algorithm derived for finding all the stable marriage assignments is proved to satisfy all the conditions of the problem. Algorithm 411 applies to this paper.
L B Wilson
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The original work of Gale and Shapley on an assignment method using the stable marriage criterion has been extended to find all the stable marriage assignments. The algorithm derived for finding all the stable marriage assignments is proved to satisfy all the conditions of the problem. Algorithm 411 applies to this paper.
L B Wilson
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On the decomposability of the stable marriage problem
BIT Numerical Mathematics, 1989zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Eugene Veklerov
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A Generalization of the Stable Marriage Problem
Journal of the Operational Research Society, 1981In this paper we extend the results of Gale and Shapely on the stable marriage problem. The set of participants in an assignment configuration is allowed to expand dynamically as long as certain relative preference conditions are maintained. The impact of this extension on complexity and performance issues are discussed.
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Procedural fairness in stable marriage problems
International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2011The stable marriage problem is a well-known problem of matching men to women so that no man and woman, who are not married to each other, both prefer each other. It has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching students to schools, or more generally to any two-sided market. Given a stable
M. Gelain +4 more
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Improved approximation results for the stable marriage problem
ACM Transactions on Algorithms, 2007The stable marriage problem has recently been studied in its general setting, where both ties and incomplete lists are allowed. It is NP-hard to find a stable matching of maximum size, while any stable matching is a maximal matching and thus trivially we can obtain a 2-approximation algorithm.
Magnus M Halldórsson +2 more
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A probabilistic version of the stable marriage problem
BIT Numerical Mathematics, 1983A new interpretation of the stable marriage problem posed by Gale and Shapley is presented. This approach enables one to solve efficiently this version of the assignment problem when it is known that the preference information is inaccurate or when there is a need to reduce the computational requirements of the problem.
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A network visualization of stable matching in the stable marriage problem
Artificial Life and Robotics, 2011The stable marriage problem (SMP) seeks matchings between n women and n men which would result in stability, and not lead to divorce or extramarital affairs. We have introduced a network consisting of nodes which represent matchings, and links between nodes which attain stability by exchanging a partner between two pairs.
Yoshihisa Morizumi +2 more
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On the Likely Number of Solutions for the Stable Marriage Problem
Combinatorics, Probability and Computing, 2009An instance of a size-n stable marriage problem involves n men and n women, each individually ranking all members of opposite sex in order of preference as a potential marriage partner. A complete matching, a set of n marriages, is called stable if no unmatched man and woman prefer each other to their partners in the matching.
Craig Lennon, Boris G. Pittel
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