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Matching with Couples Revisited [PDF]
, 2010 It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist. We introduce a new matching algorithm for such markets and show that for a general class of large random markets the algorithm will find a stable ...
Ashlagi, Itai +2 more
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A Note on the Uniqueness of Stable Marriage Matching
Discussiones Mathematicae Graph Theory, 2013 In this note we present some sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of a stable matching in the Gale-Shapley marriage classical model of even size. We also state the result on the existence of exactly two stable matchings in the marriage problem of odd
Drgas-Burchardt Ewa
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Faster and Simpler Approximation of Stable Matchings
Algorithms, 2014 We give a 3 2 -approximation algorithm for finding stable matchings that runs in O(m) time. The previous most well-known algorithm, by McDermid, has the same approximation ratio but runs in O(n3/2m) time, where n denotes the number of people andm ...
Katarzyna Paluch
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Multi-Attribute Crowdsourcing Task Assignment With Stability and Satisfactory
IEEE Access, 2019 Recently, crowdsourcing applications for smart cities have become more and more popular due to its higher work efficiency and lower work costs. However, the reasonable task assignment is still one of the important challenges for crowdsourcing.
Yuping Xing +3 more
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The exchange-stable marriage problem [PDF]
, 2005 In this paper we consider instances of stable matching problems, namely the classical stable marriage (SM) and stable roommates (SR) problems and their variants. In such instances we consider a stability criterion that has recently been proposed, that of
Abdulkadirogˇlu +16 more
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The hospitals/residents problem with ties [PDF]
, 2000 The hospitals/residents problem is an extensively-studied many-one stable matching problem. Here, we consider the hospitals/residents problem where ties are allowed in the preference lists.
Irving, R. W, Manlove, D.F., Scott, S.
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Dynamically stable matching [PDF]
Theoretical Economics, 2019 I introduce a stability notion,dynamic stability, for two‐sided dynamic matching markets where (i) matching opportunities arrive over time, (ii) matching is one‐to‐one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition addresses two conceptual issues. First, since not all agents are available to match at the same time, one must establish which agents ...
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`Sex-Equal' Stable Matchings [PDF]
Theory and Decision, 2001 This paper presents a solution concept that minimizes envy between groups 111 a bilateral matching market. This concept is designed to select stable matchings that are not men or women optimal. The idea is to compute the total number of women preferred by the men to their woman mates and the total number of men preferred by women to their mates in that
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An efficient implementation of the Gale and Shapley "propose-and-reject" algorithm
Electronic Journal of Graph Theory and Applications, 2020 We consider a version of the Hospitals/Residents problem which was first defined in 1962 by Gale and Shapley [9] under the name "College Admissions Problem". In particular, we consider the Firms/Candidates problem, where each Firm wishes to hire at least
Nasia Zacharia +2 more
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Saturating stable matchings [PDF]
Operations Research Letters, 2021 10 pages, 2 figures.
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