Results 31 to 40 of about 2,510,319 (291)
On Stable Matchings and Flows [PDF]
Algorithms, 2010 We describe a flow model related to ordinary network flows the same way as stable matchings are related to maximum matchings in bipartite graphs. We prove that there always exists a stable flow and generalize the lattice structure of stable marriages to stable flows.
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Approximability results for stable marriage problems with ties [PDF]
, 2003 We consider instances of the classical stable marriage problem in which persons may include ties in their preference lists. We show that, in such a setting, strong lower bounds hold for the approximability of each of the problems of finding an ...
Kazuo Iwama +20 more
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The hospitals/residents problem with ties [PDF]
, 2000 The hospitals/residents problem is an extensively-studied many-one stable matching problem. Here, we consider the hospitals/residents problem where ties are allowed in the preference lists.
Irving, R. W, Manlove, D.F., Scott, S.
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"Almost stable" matchings in the Roommates problem [PDF]
, 2005 An instance of the classical Stable Roommates problem (SR) need not admit a stable matching. This motivates the problem of finding a matching that is “as stable as possible”, i.e. admits the fewest number of blocking pairs. In this paper we prove that,
David J. Abraham +6 more
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Local Search Approaches in Stable Matching Problems
Algorithms, 2013 The stable marriage (SM) problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching students to schools or, more generally, to any two-sided market.
Toby Walsh +4 more
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Maintaining Stability for a Matching Problem Under Dynamic Preference
IEEE Access, 2023 This study investigates two-sided matching and considers dynamic preference. In a stable matching problem, dynamic preference is a situation that often happens in real-world situations where the agent cannot express their preference with certainty.
Akhmad Alimudin +2 more
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Dynamically stable matching [PDF]
Theoretical Economics, 2019 I introduce a stability notion,dynamic stability, for two‐sided dynamic matching markets where (i) matching opportunities arrive over time, (ii) matching is one‐to‐one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition addresses two conceptual issues. First, since not all agents are available to match at the same time, one must establish which agents ...
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Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment, 2005 11 pages, 9 figures (v2: minor changes, published version)
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An efficient implementation of the Gale and Shapley "propose-and-reject" algorithm
Electronic Journal of Graph Theory and Applications, 2020 We consider a version of the Hospitals/Residents problem which was first defined in 1962 by Gale and Shapley [9] under the name "College Admissions Problem". In particular, we consider the Firms/Candidates problem, where each Firm wishes to hire at least
Nasia Zacharia +2 more
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An algorithm for a super-stable roommates problem [PDF]
, 2011 In this paper, we describe an efficient algorithm that decides if a stable matching exists for a generalized stable roommates problem, where, instead of linear preferences, agents have partial preference orders on potential partners.
Irving, R.W. +8 more
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