Results 51 to 60 of about 3,739,569 (169)

`Sex-Equal' Stable Matchings [PDF]

open access: yesTheory and Decision, 2001
This paper presents a solution concept that minimizes envy between groups 111 a bilateral matching market. This concept is designed to select stable matchings that are not men or women optimal. The idea is to compute the total number of women preferred by the men to their woman mates and the total number of men preferred by women to their mates in that
openaire   +3 more sources

The Complexity of Stable Matchings under Substitutable Preferences

open access: yesAAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017
In various matching market settings, such as hospital-doctor matching markets (Hatfield and Milgrom 2005), the existence of stable outcomes depends on substitutability of preferences.
Yuan Deng, D. Panigrahi, Bo Waggoner
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Game theoretic analysis of centralised road backhauling market

open access: yesTransportation Research Interdisciplinary Perspectives
Geographic imbalances of trade are a major reason for empty travel in long-distance road freight markets. One strategy to reduce empty vehicle-kilometres is backhauling.
P. Delle Site, Q. Zhang
doaj   +1 more source

On the stable b-matching polytope [PDF]

open access: yesMathematical Social Sciences, 2003
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
openaire   +1 more source

The Number of Stable Matchings in Models of the Gale-Shapley Type with Preferences Given by Partial Orders

open access: yesOperations Research and Decisions, 2015
From the famous Gale-Shapley theorem we know that each classical marriage problem admits at least one stable matching. This fact has inspired researchers to search for the maximum number of possible stable matchings, which is equivalent to finding the ...
Ewa Drgas-Burchardt
doaj  

Stable Matching With Incomplete Information

open access: yesEconometrica, 2013
We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual problem is to formulate a notion of a blocking pair that takes account of the inferences that the uninformed agent might make. We show that the set of stable outcomes is nonempty in incomplete-information environments, and is a ...
Liu, Qingmin   +3 more
openaire   +4 more sources

The Distortion of Stable Matching

open access: yesCoRR
We initiate the study of distortion in stable matching. Concretely, we aim to design algorithms that have limited access to the agents' cardinal preferences and compute stable matchings of high quality with respect to some aggregate objective, e.g., the social welfare.
Aris Filos-Ratsikas   +1 more
openaire   +2 more sources

Stable Matching with Evolving Preferences

open access: yesCoRR, 2015
We consider the problem of stable matching with dynamic preference lists. At each time step, the preference list of some player may change by swapping random adjacent members. The goal of a central agency (algorithm) is to maintain an approximately stable matching (in terms of number of blocking pairs) at all times.
Varun Kanade   +2 more
openaire   +5 more sources

Byzantine Stable Matching

open access: yesProceedings of the ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing
In stable matching, one must find a matching between two sets of agents, commonly men and women, or job applicants and job positions. Each agent has a preference ordering over who they want to be matched with. Moreover a matching is said to be stable if no pair of agents prefer each other over their current matching. We consider solving stable matching
Andrei Constantinescu 0001   +3 more
openaire   +2 more sources

Finding all stable matchings with couples

open access: yes, 2015
In two-sided matching markets in which some doctors form couples, a stable matching does not necessarily exist.Wecharacterize the set of stable matchings as the fixed points of a function that is reminiscent of a tâtonnement process.
F. Kojima
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Home - About - Disclaimer - Privacy