Results 141 to 150 of about 16,334 (192)

Stackelberg versus Cournot Equilibrium

Games and Economic Behavior, 1999
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Amir, Rabah, Grilo, Isabel
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Stackelberg vs. Cournot / Bertrand Equilibrium [PDF]

open access: possible, 1994
We consider the issue of endogenous timing, according to the extended game of Hamilton-Sluytsky (1990), for the classical Coumot and Bertrand duopolies. We provide minimal sufficient conditions, directly on the primitives of each model (i.e. the demand and cost functions), yielding the simultaneous and two sequential modes of play.
AMIR, Rabah, GRILO, Isabel
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Stackelberg versus Cournot oligopoly equilibrium

International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1992
Abstract We compare an m-firm Cournot model with a hierarchical Stackelberg model where m Firms choose outputs sequentially. The Stackelberg equilibrium price is lower, so output and total surplus are higher; total profits are lower. While the first mover in a Stackelberg duopoly earns more than a Cournot duopolist, this is not necessarily true for m
Simon P. Anderson, Maxim Engers
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Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium and quasi harmonic games

Annals of Operations Research, 2021
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L. Mallozzi, A. Sacco
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Dynamic Stackelberg equilibrium congestion pricing

Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies, 2007
Abstract This paper considers the problem of dynamic congestion pricing that determines optimal time-varying tolls for a pre-specified subset of arcs with bottleneck on a congested general traffic network. A two-person nonzero-sum dynamic Stackelberg game model is formulated with the assumption that the underlying information structure is open loop ...
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A model of duopoly with Stackelberg equilibrium

Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie, 1972
to estimate the reaction function of the rival which will be shifted as it learns from experiences, i. e., observations of facts. In other words, an equilibrium is possible where conjectures are justified by results with the coefficient of conjectural variation explained in terms of parameters in demand and cost functions, if each firm is assumed to ...
Takashi Negishi, Koji Okuguchi
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Generalized Cournot-Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium

Cybernetics and Systems Analysis, 2006
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Stackelberg-Nash Equilibrium in the Linear City Model

Automation and Remote Control, 2020
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