Results 91 to 100 of about 751,764 (271)
Learning in Stackelberg Markov Games
Designing socially optimal policies in multi-agent environments is a fundamental challenge in both economics and artificial intelligence. This paper studies a general framework for learning Stackelberg equilibria in dynamic and uncertain environments, where a single leader interacts with a population of adaptive followers.
Jun He, Andrew L. Liu, Yihsu Chen
openaire +2 more sources
Coresidence: How parental characteristics matter
Abstract Coresidence in the parental home is known to depend on young adult characteristics and market conditions, but there is more limited knowledge on whether or how parental characteristics matter. We model the coresidence outcome as a multigenerational joint optimization decision and use Panel Study of Income Dynamics data to examine the ...
Arthur Acolin +2 more
wiley +1 more source
This paper focuses on the anti-jamming transmission problem in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) communication networks. Considering the incomplete information constraint and the co-channel mutual interference, a Bayesian Stackelberg game is proposed to ...
Yifan Xu +7 more
doaj +1 more source
Abstract In most blood supply chains, blood centers and hospitals make individual decisions, resulting in an inefficient structure of the blood supply chain, which in turn renders supply and demand matching a challenging exercise. In this work, we make the very first attempt to optimize the interaction between blood centers and hospitals.
Mohammad S. Moshtagh +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Gradient Methods for Solving Stackelberg Games [PDF]
Stackelberg Games are gaining importance in the last years due to the raise of Adversarial Machine Learning (AML). Within this context, a new paradigm must be faced: in classical game theory, inter- vening agents were humans whose decisions are generally discrete and low dimensional.
Roi Naveiro, David Ríos Insua
openaire +4 more sources
Regret in durable‐good monopoly
I study a dynamic model of durable‐good monopoly where the seller minimizes lifetime regret against the worst‐case type of buyer. The optimal mechanism is time consistent: at no point can the seller benefit from replacing it with another mechanism. Despite this, the optimal mechanism cannot be supported in an equilibrium without commitment.
Rumen Kostadinov
wiley +1 more source
Intelligent jammer can analyze the history of user’s transmission and control their own behavior,so it has brought new threats to the wireless network.In order to analyze the behavior of users and intelligent jammers in a multi-channel wireless network,a
Hengjie ZHOU +3 more
doaj +2 more sources
ABSTRACT Depression is a mental disorder with a high lifetime prevalence and one of the leading causes of disability worldwide. As many patients experience another depressive episode after being treated, predictive monitoring for the risk of relapse is essential for healthcare professionals to be able to follow up on patients and intervene early ...
Paulina von Stackelberg +4 more
wiley +1 more source
Do followers really matter in Stackelberg competition? [PDF]
In this note, we consider a generalized T−stage Stackelberg oligopoly. We provide a proof and an interpretation that under the two necessary and sufficient conditions of linear aggregate demand and identical constant marginal costs, followers do not ...
Ludovic A. Julien +2 more
core
Vulnerability and Defence: A Case for Stackelberg Game Dynamics
This paper examines the tactical interaction between drones and tanks in modern warfare through game theory, particularly focusing on Stackelberg equilibrium and backward induction.
Azhar Iqbal +6 more
doaj +1 more source

