Results 91 to 100 of about 21,636 (205)

Order Routing and Market Quality: Who Benefits From Internalization?

open access: yesMathematical Finance, Volume 36, Issue 2, Page 397-421, April 2026.
ABSTRACT Does retail order internalization benefit (via price improvement) or harm (via reduced liquidity) retail traders? To answer this question, we compare two market designs that differ in their mode of liquidity provision: In the setting capturing retail order internalization, liquidity is provided by market makers (wholesalers) competing for the ...
Umut Çeti̇n, Albina Danilova
wiley   +1 more source

Stackelberg oligopoly TU-games: characterization of the core and 1-concavity of the dual game [PDF]

open access: yes
In this article we consider Stackelberg oligopoly TU-games in gamma-characteristic function form (Chander and Tulkens 1997) in which any deviating coalition produces an output at a first period as a leader and outsiders simultaneously and independently ...
Aymeric Lardon   +2 more
core  

A Stackelberg Game Model of Flocking

open access: yes2024 IEEE 63rd Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)
We study a Stackelberg game to examine how two agents determine to cooperate while competing with each other. Each selects an arrival time to a destination, the earlier one fetching a higher reward. There is, however, an inherent penalty in arriving too early as well as a risk in traveling alone.
Chenlan Wang   +2 more
openaire   +2 more sources

Inter-Operator Spectrum Sharing from a Game Theoretical Perspective

open access: yesEURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing, 2009
We address the problem of spectrum sharing where competitive operators coexist in the same frequency band. First, we model this problem as a strategic non-cooperative game where operators simultaneously share the spectrum according to the Nash ...
Samson Lasaulce   +2 more
doaj   +1 more source

Stackelberg Game Based Power Control with Outage Probability Constraints for Cognitive Radio Networks

open access: yesInternational Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks, 2015
This paper firstly investigates the problem of uplink power control in cognitive radio networks (CRNs) with multiple primary users (PUs) and multiple second users (SUs) considering channel outage constraints and interference power constraints, where PUs ...
Helin Yang   +2 more
doaj   +1 more source

Optimal Tariffs on Exhaustible Resources: The Case of a Quantity Setting Cartel [PDF]

open access: yes
We formulate a dynamic game model of trade in an exhaustible resource with a quantity-setting cartel. We compute the feedback Nash equilibrium and two Stackelberg equilibria under two different leadership scenarios: leadership by the strategic importing ...
Kenji Fujiwara, Ngo Van Long
core  

To commit or not to commit: Endogenous timing in experimental duopoly markets [PDF]

open access: yes
In this paper, we experimentally investigate the extended game with action commitment of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). In their duopoly game, firms can choose their quantities in one of two periods before the market clears. If a firm commits to a quantity
Hans-Theo Normann   +2 more
core  

Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly [PDF]

open access: yes, 2007
This paper addresses the issue of endogenizing the equilibrium solution when a private - domestic or foreign - firm competes in the quantities with a public, welfare maximizing firm.
Amir, Rabah, De Feo, Giuseppe
core   +1 more source

On the Coincidence of the Feedback Nash and Stackelberg Equilibria in Economic Applications of Differential Games [PDF]

open access: yes
In this paper the scope of the applicability of the Stackelberg equilibrium concept in differential games is investigated. Firstly, conditions for obtaining the coincidence between the Stackelberg and Nash equilibria are defined in terms of the ...
Santiago J. Rubio
core  

Optimal Tariffs on Exhaustible Resources: The Case of Quantity Setting [PDF]

open access: yes
Constructing a dynamic game model of trade of an exhaustible resource, this paper compares feedback Nash and Stackelberg equilibria. We consider two dierent leadership scenarios: leadership by the importing country, and leadership by the exporting ...
Kenji Fujiwara, Ngo Van Long
core  

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