Results 71 to 80 of about 751,764 (271)

SMEs and Climate Finance: A Hybrid Review

open access: yesJournal of Economic Surveys, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT The growing importance of sustainability and environmental practices, along with a recent surge in related research, motivated this review of environmental management and climate finance within the SME sector. Starting with an initial sample of 2063 articles, we refined the dataset, resulting in a final sample of 124 key publications.
Ashraf Khan   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

Privatization in oligopoly : the impact of the shadow cost of public funds [PDF]

open access: yes, 2008
The aim of this paper is to investigate the welfare eect of privatization in oligopoly when the government takes into account the distortionary eect of rising funds by taxation (shadow cost of public funds).
De Feo, Giuseppe   +3 more
core   +1 more source

Lurking Patent Claims and Strategic Royalty Contracts

open access: yesThe Journal of Industrial Economics, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This paper analyzes optimal licensing contracts when a licensee faces the risk of future infringement claims by unknown patent holders. In a setting where a noncompeting licensor contracts with a monopolistic manufacturer, fixed‐fee licensing is optimal absent such claims.
Jay Pil Choi
wiley   +1 more source

The Sample Complexity of Stackelberg Games

open access: yesCoRR
Stackelberg games (SGs) constitute the most fundamental and acclaimed models of strategic interactions involving some form of commitment. Moreover, they form the basis of more elaborate models of this kind, such as, e.g., Bayesian persuasion and principal-agent problems.
Francesco Bacchiocchi   +4 more
openaire   +3 more sources

Equilibrium Reward for Liquidity Providers in Automated Market Makers

open access: yesMathematical Finance, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We find the equilibrium contract that an automated market maker (AMM) offers to their strategic liquidity providers (LPs) in order to maximize the order flow that gets processed by the venue. Our model is formulated as a leader–follower stochastic game, where the venue is the leader and a representative LP is the follower.
Alif Aqsha   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

Optimal Tariffs on Exhaustible Resources: The Case of Quantity Setting [PDF]

open access: yes
Constructing a dynamic game model of trade of an exhaustible resource, this paper compares feedback Nash and Stackelberg equilibria. We consider two dierent leadership scenarios: leadership by the importing country, and leadership by the exporting ...
Kenji Fujiwara, Ngo Van Long
core   +2 more sources

Stackelberg Stopping Games

open access: yes
We study a Stackelberg variant of the classical Dynkin game in discrete time, where the two players are no longer on equal footing. Player 1 (the leader) announces her stopping strategy first, and Player 2 (the follower) responds optimally. This Stackelberg stopping game can be viewed as an optimal control problem for the leader.
Zhang, Jingjie, Zhou, Zhou
openaire   +2 more sources

On Stackelberg Strategies in Affine Congestion Games

open access: yesTheory of Computing Systems, 2015
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Bilò Vittorio, Vinci Cosimo
openaire   +2 more sources

An Existence Result for Hierarchical Stackelberg v/s Stackelberg Games [PDF]

open access: yesIEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 2015
This submission contains some results drawn from an earlier manuscript (http://arxiv.org/abs/1206.2968v2) which was rejected. The earlier manuscript has been split into 3 parts. One part is published in the Proc IEEE CDC, 2013, another is under review with Set-valued and Varitional Analysis (on arxiv).
Ankur A. Kulkarni, Uday V. Shanbhag
openaire   +2 more sources

Random Carbon Tax Policy and Investment Into Emission Abatement Technologies

open access: yesMathematical Finance, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We analyze the problem of a profit‐maximizing electricity producer, subject to carbon taxes, who decides on investments into CO2$\rm CO_2$ abatement technologies. We assume that the carbon tax policy is random and that the investment in the abatement technology is divisible, irreversible, and subject to transaction costs.
Katia Colaneri   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

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