Results 51 to 60 of about 2,295 (180)
Learning in Conjectural Stackelberg Games
CoRRWe extend the formalism of Conjectural Variations games to Stackelberg games involving multiple leaders and a single follower. To solve these nonconvex games, a common assumption is that the leaders compute their strategies having perfect knowledge of the follower's best response.
Morri, Francesco +2 more
openaire +3 more sources
Lurking Patent Claims and Strategic Royalty Contracts
The Journal of Industrial Economics, EarlyView.ABSTRACT This paper analyzes optimal licensing contracts when a licensee faces the risk of future infringement claims by unknown patent holders. In a setting where a noncompeting licensor contracts with a monopolistic manufacturer, fixed‐fee licensing is optimal absent such claims.
Jay Pil Choi
wiley +1 more source
Learning in Structured Stackelberg Games
CoRRWe initiate the study of structured Stackelberg games, a novel form of strategic interaction between a leader and a follower where contextual information can be predictive of the follower's (unknown) type. Motivated by applications such as security games and AI safety, we show how this additional structure can help the leader learn a utility-maximizing
Maria-Florina Balcan +2 more
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Equilibrium Reward for Liquidity Providers in Automated Market Makers
Mathematical Finance, EarlyView.ABSTRACT We find the equilibrium contract that an automated market maker (AMM) offers to their strategic liquidity providers (LPs) in order to maximize the order flow that gets processed by the venue. Our model is formulated as a leader–follower stochastic game, where the venue is the leader and a representative LP is the follower.
Alif Aqsha +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Mathematics, 2023 Critical infrastructure is essential for the stability and development of modern society, and a combination of complex network theory and game theory has become a new research direction in the field of infrastructure protection. However, existing studies
Yibo Dong +4 more
doaj +1 more source
Random Carbon Tax Policy and Investment Into Emission Abatement Technologies
Mathematical Finance, EarlyView.ABSTRACT We analyze the problem of a profit‐maximizing electricity producer, subject to carbon taxes, who decides on investments into CO2$\rm CO_2$ abatement technologies. We assume that the carbon tax policy is random and that the investment in the abatement technology is divisible, irreversible, and subject to transaction costs.
Katia Colaneri +2 more
wiley +1 more source
We study a Stackelberg variant of the classical discrete-time Dynkin game, in which Player 1 (the leader) commits to a stopping strategy first and Player 2 (the follower) responds optimally. This leader-follower structure induces an optimal control problem for the leader and gives rise to intrinsic time-inconsistency.
Zhang, Jingjie, Zhou, Zhou
openaire +2 more sources
The Sample Complexity of Stackelberg Games
CoRRStackelberg games (SGs) constitute the most fundamental and acclaimed models of strategic interactions involving some form of commitment. Moreover, they form the basis of more elaborate models of this kind, such as, e.g., Bayesian persuasion and principal-agent problems.
Francesco Bacchiocchi +4 more
openaire +3 more sources
Personalized Model‐Driven Interventions for Decisions From Experience
Topics in Cognitive Science, EarlyView.Abstract Cognitive models that represent individuals provide many benefits for understanding the full range of human behavior. One way in which individual differences emerge is through differences in knowledge. In dynamic situations, where decisions are made from experience, models built upon a theory of experiential choice (instance‐based learning ...
Edward A. Cranford +6 more
wiley +1 more source
On Stackelberg Strategies in Affine Congestion Games
Theory of Computing Systems, 2015 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Bilò Vittorio, Vinci Cosimo
openaire +2 more sources