Results 61 to 70 of about 21,636 (205)
Critical infrastructure is essential for the stability and development of modern society, and a combination of complex network theory and game theory has become a new research direction in the field of infrastructure protection. However, existing studies
Yibo Dong +4 more
doaj +1 more source
Learning in Structured Stackelberg Games
We initiate the study of structured Stackelberg games, a novel form of strategic interaction between a leader and a follower where contextual information can be predictive of the follower's (unknown) type. Motivated by applications such as security games and AI safety, we show how this additional structure can help the leader learn a utility-maximizing
Maria-Florina Balcan +2 more
openaire +2 more sources
On Stackelberg Strategies in Affine Congestion Games
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Bilò Vittorio, Vinci Cosimo
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An Existence Result for Hierarchical Stackelberg v/s Stackelberg Games [PDF]
This submission contains some results drawn from an earlier manuscript (http://arxiv.org/abs/1206.2968v2) which was rejected. The earlier manuscript has been split into 3 parts. One part is published in the Proc IEEE CDC, 2013, another is under review with Set-valued and Varitional Analysis (on arxiv).
Ankur A. Kulkarni, Uday V. Shanbhag
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Equilibrium Reward for Liquidity Providers in Automated Market Makers
ABSTRACT We find the equilibrium contract that an automated market maker (AMM) offers to their strategic liquidity providers (LPs) in order to maximize the order flow that gets processed by the venue. Our model is formulated as a leader–follower stochastic game, where the venue is the leader and a representative LP is the follower.
Alif Aqsha +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Random Carbon Tax Policy and Investment Into Emission Abatement Technologies
ABSTRACT We analyze the problem of a profit‐maximizing electricity producer, subject to carbon taxes, who decides on investments into CO2$\rm CO_2$ abatement technologies. We assume that the carbon tax policy is random and that the investment in the abatement technology is divisible, irreversible, and subject to transaction costs.
Katia Colaneri +2 more
wiley +1 more source
We study a Stackelberg variant of the classical Dynkin game in discrete time, where the two players are no longer on equal footing. Player 1 (the leader) announces her stopping strategy first, and Player 2 (the follower) responds optimally. This Stackelberg stopping game can be viewed as an optimal control problem for the leader.
Zhang, Jingjie, Zhou, Zhou
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Imitative Follower Deception in Stackelberg Games [PDF]
Information uncertainty is one of the major challenges facing applications of game theory. In the context of Stackelberg games, various approaches have been proposed to deal with the leader's incomplete knowledge about the follower's payoffs, typically by gathering information from the leader's interaction with the follower.
Jiarui Gan +5 more
openaire +2 more sources
Personalized Model‐Driven Interventions for Decisions From Experience
Abstract Cognitive models that represent individuals provide many benefits for understanding the full range of human behavior. One way in which individual differences emerge is through differences in knowledge. In dynamic situations, where decisions are made from experience, models built upon a theory of experiential choice (instance‐based learning ...
Edward A. Cranford +6 more
wiley +1 more source
Satisfaction and Regret in Stackelberg Games
This paper introduces the new concept of (follower) satisfaction in Stackelberg games and compares the standard Stackelberg game with its satisfaction version. Simulation results are presented which suggest that the follower adopting satisfaction generally increases leader utility.
Langford B. White +2 more
openaire +2 more sources

