Results 61 to 70 of about 2,400 (182)
Gradient Methods for Solving Stackelberg Games [PDF]
Stackelberg Games are gaining importance in the last years due to the raise of Adversarial Machine Learning (AML). Within this context, a new paradigm must be faced: in classical game theory, inter- vening agents were humans whose decisions are generally discrete and low dimensional.
Roi Naveiro, David Ríos Insua
openaire +6 more sources
Equilibrium Reward for Liquidity Providers in Automated Market Makers
ABSTRACT We find the equilibrium contract that an automated market maker (AMM) offers to their strategic liquidity providers (LPs) in order to maximize the order flow that gets processed by the venue. Our model is formulated as a leader–follower stochastic game, where the venue is the leader and a representative LP is the follower.
Alif Aqsha +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Sequential decomposition of Stochastic Stackelberg games
In this paper, we consider a discrete-time stochastic Stackelberg game with a single leader and multiple followers. Both the followers and the leader together have conditionally independent private types, conditioned on action and previous state, that evolve as controlled Markov processes.
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An Existence Result for Hierarchical Stackelberg v/s Stackelberg Games [PDF]
This submission contains some results drawn from an earlier manuscript (http://arxiv.org/abs/1206.2968v2) which was rejected. The earlier manuscript has been split into 3 parts. One part is published in the Proc IEEE CDC, 2013, another is under review with Set-valued and Varitional Analysis (on arxiv).
Ankur A. Kulkarni, Uday V. Shanbhag
openaire +3 more sources
Personalized Model‐Driven Interventions for Decisions From Experience
Abstract Cognitive models that represent individuals provide many benefits for understanding the full range of human behavior. One way in which individual differences emerge is through differences in knowledge. In dynamic situations, where decisions are made from experience, models built upon a theory of experiential choice (instance‐based learning ...
Edward A. Cranford +6 more
wiley +1 more source
Learning in Stackelberg Markov Games
Designing socially optimal policies in multi-agent environments is a fundamental challenge in both economics and artificial intelligence. This paper studies a general framework for learning Stackelberg equilibria in dynamic and uncertain environments, where a single leader interacts with a population of adaptive followers.
Jun He, Andrew L. Liu, Yihsu Chen
openaire +2 more sources
The proliferation of microgrids and the rapid electrification of transportation have intensified competition for distribution-level resources, highlighting the need for effective coordination strategies for energy sharing and electric vehicle (EV ...
Jieyun Zheng +5 more
doaj +1 more source
Abstract The application of automated ground vehicles (AGVs) is well‐established in closed environments such as port terminals, while their operation in open areas remains challenging. In this work, we set out to overcome this limitation by introducing platooning as a transfer mode in heterogeneous vehicle networks.
Nadia Pourmohammad‐Zia +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Network scheduling algorithm based on Stackelberg Game with incentive strategy
First, a Stackelberg Game network model was built. In this model, the existence of Nash equilibrium was analyzed and the team optimal solution of the network was available.
WEI Jiao-long +3 more
doaj +2 more sources
In this paper, we propose game-theoretic approaches to model the cooperative spectrum sensing in cognitive radio environment with cognitive secondary users (SU) capable of energy harvesting. An evolutionary game model is considered in the first scenario,
Osama Elnahas +3 more
doaj +1 more source

