Hardness of an Asymmetric 2-Player Stackelberg Network Pricing Game
Consider a communication network represented by a directed graph G=(V,E) of n nodes and m edges. Assume that edges in E are partitioned into two sets: a set C of edges with a fixed non-negative real cost, and a set P of edges whose costs are instead ...
Davide Bilò +2 more
doaj +1 more source
Some Results on the Control of Polluting Firms According to Dynamic Nash and Stackelberg Patterns
In this paper we model the conflict between the group of polluting firms in a country and any social planner in the same country who attempts to control the volume of emissions generated during the production process.
George E. Halkos, George J. Papageorgiou
doaj +1 more source
P-graph Approach to Solving a Class of Stackelberg Games in Carbon Management
Climate change mitigation can be achieved through the large-scale deployment of different carbon management technologies in industry. Governments will also play an important role in creating regulatory environments that incentivize low-carbon investments
Raymond R. Tan +2 more
doaj +1 more source
Robust Stackelberg Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games and Extension to Limited Lookahead
Stackelberg equilibria have become increasingly important as a solution concept in computational game theory, largely inspired by practical problems such as security settings. In practice, however, there is typically uncertainty regarding the model about
Linping Zhang (1982398) +4 more
core +14 more sources
The equilibrium results analysis in a competing supply chains with consumer returns
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is, to examine the optimal pricing and ordering strategy of two competing chains with customer returns in Bertrand-Nash game and Stackelberg game, and to investigate in what cases the manufacturer can make more profits ...
Jian Liu, Haiyan Wang
doaj +1 more source
Secure control plane for SDN using Bayesian Stackelberg games
A dynamic scheduling controller in SDN control layer was proposed by dynamically transform heteroge-neous controlled in order to increase the difficulty of the attacker.Firstly,a dynamic scheduling method based on Bayesian Stackelberg games the attacker ...
Zhen-ping LU,Fu-cai CHEN,Guo-zhen CHENG
doaj +3 more sources
Stackelberg Population Dynamics: A Predictive-Sensitivity Approach
Hierarchical decision-making processes traditionally modeled as bilevel optimization problems are widespread in modern engineering and social systems. In this work, we deal with a leader with a population of followers in a hierarchical order of play.
Eduardo Mojica-Nava, Fredy Ruiz
doaj +1 more source
Imitators and Optimizers in Cournot Oligopoly [PDF]
We analyze a symmetric n-firm Cournot oligopoly with a heterogeneous population of optimizers and imitators. Imitators mimic the output decision of the most successful firms of the previous round a l`a Vega-Redondo (1997).
Schipper, Burkhard C.
core +4 more sources
Tactical and Strategic Risks From Supply Disruptions in Competing Supply Chains
ABSTRACT Supply chain disruptions can lead to both tactical (i.e., loss of short‐term sales during a disruption) and strategic (i.e., loss of long‐term market share) consequences. We model the impact of a supply disruption on competing supply chains in which two firms compete for a limited backup supply.
Akhil Singla +3 more
wiley +1 more source
Leadership in Singleton Congestion Games: What is Hard and What is Easy
We study the problem of computing Stackelberg equilibria Stackelberg games whose underlying structure is in congestion games, focusing on the case where each player can choose a single resource (a.k.a.
Castiglioni, Matteo +3 more
core +1 more source

