Results 41 to 50 of about 565 (179)
Assessing second‐price auctions for parcel exchanges in last‐mile logistics
International Transactions in Operational Research, EarlyView.Abstract The rapid growth of e‐commerce has led to multiple carriers operating in the same regions, creating opportunities for collaboration. However, logistics companies typically operate independently, leading to inefficiencies. Horizontal cooperation, where carriers share resources and infrastructure, can improve efficiency and reduce costs.
Christian Truden, Margaretha Gansterer
wiley +1 more source
The Complexity of Stackelberg Pricing Games
CoRRWe consider Stackelberg pricing games, which are also known as bilevel pricing problems, or combinatorial price-setting problems. This family of problems consists of games between two players: the leader and the follower. There is a market that is partitioned into two parts: the part of the leader and the part of the leader's competitors.
Christoph Grüne +3 more
openaire +2 more sources
Linear discrete-time Pareto-Nash-Stackelberg control problem and principles for its solving [PDF]
Computer Science Journal of Moldova, 2013 A direct-straightforward method for solving linear discrete-time optimal control problem is applied to solve control problem of a linear discrete-time system as a mixture of multi-criteria Stackelberg and Nash games.
Valeriu Ungureanu
doaj
Non cooperative Stackelberg network formation
Cuadernos de Economía, 2014 Non-cooperative network formation games in industrial organizations analyze how firms create links. We assume that links portray cost-reducing information and that access to this information is not reciprocal.
Juan M.C Larrosa
doaj +1 more source
SMEs and Climate Finance: A Hybrid Review
Journal of Economic Surveys, EarlyView.ABSTRACT The growing importance of sustainability and environmental practices, along with a recent surge in related research, motivated this review of environmental management and climate finance within the SME sector. Starting with an initial sample of 2063 articles, we refined the dataset, resulting in a final sample of 124 key publications.
Ashraf Khan +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Learning in Conjectural Stackelberg Games
CoRRWe extend the formalism of Conjectural Variations games to Stackelberg games involving multiple leaders and a single follower. To solve these nonconvex games, a common assumption is that the leaders compute their strategies having perfect knowledge of the follower's best response.
Morri, Francesco +2 more
openaire +3 more sources
Is product with a special feature still rewarding? The case of the Japanese yogurt market
Cogent Economics & Finance, 2016 Manufacturers of packaged consumer goods strive to develop a new product with a special feature that could provide additional value to consumers. However, it is less clear whether such an effort is still rewarding in terms of margin if manufacturers are ...
Tomohito Kamai, Yuichiro Kanazawa
doaj +1 more source
Lurking Patent Claims and Strategic Royalty Contracts
The Journal of Industrial Economics, EarlyView.ABSTRACT This paper analyzes optimal licensing contracts when a licensee faces the risk of future infringement claims by unknown patent holders. In a setting where a noncompeting licensor contracts with a monopolistic manufacturer, fixed‐fee licensing is optimal absent such claims.
Jay Pil Choi
wiley +1 more source
Learning in Structured Stackelberg Games
CoRRWe initiate the study of structured Stackelberg games, a novel form of strategic interaction between a leader and a follower where contextual information can be predictive of the follower's (unknown) type. Motivated by applications such as security games and AI safety, we show how this additional structure can help the leader learn a utility-maximizing
Maria-Florina Balcan +2 more
openaire +2 more sources
Equilibrium Reward for Liquidity Providers in Automated Market Makers
Mathematical Finance, EarlyView.ABSTRACT We find the equilibrium contract that an automated market maker (AMM) offers to their strategic liquidity providers (LPs) in order to maximize the order flow that gets processed by the venue. Our model is formulated as a leader–follower stochastic game, where the venue is the leader and a representative LP is the follower.
Alif Aqsha +2 more
wiley +1 more source