Results 71 to 80 of about 11,565 (207)
We study a Stackelberg variant of the classical Dynkin game in discrete time, where the two players are no longer on equal footing. Player 1 (the leader) announces her stopping strategy first, and Player 2 (the follower) responds optimally. This Stackelberg stopping game can be viewed as an optimal control problem for the leader.
Zhang, Jingjie, Zhou, Zhou
openaire +2 more sources
Personalized Model‐Driven Interventions for Decisions From Experience
Topics in Cognitive Science, EarlyView.Abstract Cognitive models that represent individuals provide many benefits for understanding the full range of human behavior. One way in which individual differences emerge is through differences in knowledge. In dynamic situations, where decisions are made from experience, models built upon a theory of experiential choice (instance‐based learning ...
Edward A. Cranford +6 more
wiley +1 more source
International Journal of Industrial Engineering and Production Research, 2016 Pricing and advertising are two important marketing strategies in the supply chain management which lead to customer demand’s increase and therefore higher profit for members of supply chains. This paper considers advertising, and pricing decisions
Parinaz Esmaeili +2 more
doaj
Optimal Monetary Policy and the Asset Market: A Non-cooperative Game [PDF]
, 2003 In this paper we construct a model of a policy game in order to analyse the optimal reaction function of the Central Bank to a shock in the asset market.
Ioannidis, C, Napolitano, O
core
On the Inducibility of Stackelberg Equilibrium for Security Games
, 2018 Strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) is the standard solution concept of Stackelberg security games. As opposed to the weak Stackelberg equilibrium (WSE), the SSE assumes that the follower breaks ties in favor of the leader and this is widely ...
An, Bo +5 more
core +1 more source
Satisfaction and Regret in Stackelberg Games
CoRRThis paper introduces the new concept of (follower) satisfaction in Stackelberg games and compares the standard Stackelberg game with its satisfaction version. Simulation results are presented which suggest that the follower adopting satisfaction generally increases leader utility.
Langford B. White +2 more
openaire +2 more sources
Circular economy business strategies and public schemes: a game theory‐based survey
International Transactions in Operational Research, Volume 33, Issue 5, Page 2827-2869, September 2026.Abstract This paper develops a selected survey based on game theory in circular economy (CE) by complementing two perspectives: the CE business strategies and the public schemes (PS) available to implement CE systems. These perspectives are concentrated in six CE business strategies (circular inputs, sharing platforms, product‐as‐a‐service (PaaS ...
Vinay Ramani, Pietro De Giovanni
wiley +1 more source
MULŢIMI DE ECHILIBRE STACKELBERG ÎN JOCURILE DIADICE ÎN STRATEGII MIXTE
Studia Universitatis Moldaviae: Stiinte Umanistice, 2010 We consider the problem of determining the set of Stackelberg equilibria for dyadic games in mixed strategies. We propose an algorithm for determining the Stackelberg equilibria in dyadic games.The main results are formulated and explained.
USM ADMIN
doaj
Resource Allocation in Multi-User Cognitive Radio Network With Stackelberg Game
IEEE Access, 2020 Resource allocation with sensing-based interference price is considered for multi-users cognitive radio (CR) network, in which the primary base station (PBS) controls the secondary users' (SUs) transmission by pricing the SUs' interference power.
Bing Ning +5 more
doaj +1 more source
Enabling Stochastic Dynamic Games for Robotic Swarms
Advanced Intelligent Systems, Volume 8, Issue 5, May 2026.This paper scales stochastic dynamic games to large swarms of robots through selective agent modeling and variable partial belief space planning. We formulate these games using a belief space variant of iterative Linear Quadratic Gaussian (iLQG). We scale to teams of 50 agents through selective modeling based on the estimated influence of agents ...
Kamran Vakil, Alyssa Pierson
wiley +1 more source