Results 11 to 20 of about 10,494 (264)
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2015 In 1953, Lloyd Shapley contributed his paper “Stochastic games” to PNAS. In this paper, he defined the model of stochastic games, which were the first general dynamic model of a game to be defined, and proved that it admits a stationary equilibrium. In this Perspective, we summarize the historical context and the impact of Shapley’s contribution.
Solan, Eilon, Vieille, Nicolas
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Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021 Some of the most relevant future applications of multi-agent systems like autonomous driving or factories as a service display mixed-motive scenarios, where agents might have conflicting goals. In these settings agents are likely to learn undesirable outcomes in terms of cooperation under independent learning, such as overly greedy behavior.
Kyrill Schmid +4 more
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Stochastic bankruptcy games [PDF]
International Journal of Game Theory, 2011 Uncertain cooperative games with transferable utility are defined as an extension of cooperative games with transferable utility. Correspondingly, the notion of weak sequential core is defined. Stochastic bankruptcy games are cast in this framework and it is proved that several allocation rules from the literature do not belong to the weak sequential ...
Helga Habis, P. Jean-Jacques Herings
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Strategic coalitions in stochastic games [PDF]
Journal of Logic and Computation, 2021 AbstractThe article compares two different approaches of incorporating probability into coalition logics. One is based on the semantics of games with stochastic transitions and the other on games with the stochastic failures. The work gives an example of a non-trivial property of coalition power for the first approach and a complete axiomatization for ...
Pavel Naumov, Kevin Ros
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On the Stochasticity of Ultimatum Games
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2022 Brenner and Vriend (2006) argued (experimentally and theoretically) that one should not expect proposers in ultimatum games to learn to converge to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium offer, as finding the optimal offer is a hard learning problem for (boundedly-rational) proposers.
Tianxiao Qi +3 more
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Evolutionary Stochastic Games [PDF]
Dynamic Games and Applications, 2012 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Flesch, J. +3 more
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Applied Mathematics & Optimization, 2023 AbstractA two-person zero-sum stochastic game with a nonnegative stage reward function is superfair if the value of the one-shot game at each state is at least as large as the reward function at the given state. The payoff in the game is the limit superior of the expected stage rewards taken over the directed set of all finite stop rules.
János Flesch +2 more
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Two-Person Stochastic Duel with Energy Fuel Constraint Ammo
Mathematics, 2023 This paper deals with a novel variation of the versatile stochastic duel game that incorporates an energy fuel constraint into a two-player duel game. The energy fuel not only measures the vitality of players but also determines the power of the shooting
Song-Kyoo (Amang) Kim
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Tree games with regular objectives [PDF]
Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science, 2014 We study tree games developed recently by Matteo Mio as a game interpretation of the probabilistic μ-calculus. With expressive power comes complexity.
Marcin Przybyłko
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n-Player Stochastic Duel Game Model with Applied Deep Learning and Its Modern Implications
Sensors, 2022 This paper provides a conceptual foundation for stochastic duels and contains a further study of the game models based on the theory of stochastic duels.
Manik Gupta +6 more
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