Results 21 to 30 of about 2,883,104 (305)
Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
Games and Economic Behavior, 2017 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Erdamar, Bora +2 more
openaire +4 more sources
REACT: STRATEGI PEMBELAJARAN UNTUK MENGEMBANGKAN KEMAMPUAN MAHASISWA DALAM MENGKONSTRUKSI BUKTI
Aksioma: Jurnal Program Studi Pendidikan Matematika, 2020 Tujuan penelitian ini adalah untuk mendiskripsikan penerapan strategi REACT (Relating, Experiencing, Applying, Cooperating, Transferring) untuk mengembangkan kemampuan mahasiswa dalam mengkonstruksi bukti.
Arif Hidayatul Khusna
doaj +1 more source
Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence
International Journal of Economic Theory, 2019 AbstractWe prove that group strategy‐proofness and strategy‐proofness are equivalent requirements on stable mechanisms in priority‐based resource allocation problems with multi‐unit demand. The result extends to the model with contracts.
Romero Medina, Antonio, Triossi, Matteo
openaire +3 more sources
Equivalence of eval-readback and eval-apply big-step evaluators by structuring the lambda-calculus's strategy space [PDF]
Logical Methods in Computer ScienceWe study the equivalence between eval-readback and eval-apply big-step evaluators in the general setting of the pure lambda calculus. We study `one-step' equivalence (same strategy) and also discuss `big-step' equivalence (same final result).
Pablo Nogueira, Álvaro García-Pérez
doaj +1 more source
Automation of strategy using IDEF0 — A proof of concept
Operations Research Perspectives, 2015 The goal of this interdisciplinary paper is to show that an existing modeling language, Integration Definition for Function Modeling (IDEF0), is applicable for use in strategy modeling and for automation of strategic plan development and implementation ...
Gary R. Waissi +3 more
doaj +1 more source
Note on Complete Proof of Axelrod’s Theorem
Annals of Business Administrative Science, 2003 This note will give a complete proof of Axelrod’s theorem that characterizes the advantage of Tit-for-Tat (TFT) strategy in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma. Despite of its importance in Axelrod’s study, the proof of the theorem is incomplete.
Takashi SHIMIZU, Nobuo TAKAHASHI
doaj +1 more source
Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for pure public goods economies when preferences are monotonic [PDF]
, 1999 A fundamental problem in public finance is that of allocating a␣given budget to financing the provision of public goods (education, transportation, police, etc.). In this paper it is established that when␣admissible preferences are those representable by
Moreno, Diego, Diego Moreno
core +1 more source
Robust group strategy‐proofness
Theoretical Economics, 2021 Strategy‐proofness (SP) is a sought‐after property in social choice functions because it ensures that agents have no incentive to misrepresent their private information at both the interim and ex post stages. Group strategy‐proofness (GSP), however, is a notion that is applied to the ex post stage but not to the interim stage.
Kivinen, Steven, Tumennasan, Norovsambuu
openaire +2 more sources
Strategy‐proof size improvement: is it possible?* [PDF]
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2023 AbstractThe number of assigned agents (i.e., size) is an important parameter in object allocations. While size maximality clashes with individual rationality and strategy‐proofness, it can still be possible to increase the size over a mechanism while keeping these properties. To pursue this research, we devise a size comparison criterion to investigate
Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz, Dur, Umut Mert
openaire +4 more sources
A Note on Shortest Developments [PDF]
Logical Methods in Computer Science, 2007 De Vrijer has presented a proof of the finite developments theorem which, in addition to showing that all developments are finite, gives an effective reduction strategy computing longest developments as well as a simple formula computing their length ...
Morten Heine Sørensen
doaj +1 more source