Results 91 to 100 of about 26,202 (266)
On the equivalence between subgame perfection and sequentiality [PDF]
, 2005 We identify the maximal set of finite extensive forms for which the sets of subgame perfect and sequential equilibrium strategies coincide for any possible assignment of the payoff function.
González Pimienta,Carlos +1 more
core +1 more source
Serial Investing and Strategic Commitment in Markets With Unknown Competitors
Journal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.ABSTRACT We study how serial investors who regularly face unknown competitors attempt to make their projects dominant. Innovating in new markets often involves uncertainty over the nature of the final product and who the key competitors will be. Such projects also have long‐term funding needs, so a commitment to provide the necessary funds imparts a ...
Naveen Khanna, Richmond Mathews
wiley +1 more source
Discounting and efficiency in coalitional bargaining with random proposers [PDF]
This paper analyzes a random-proposer coalitional bargaining game with different discount factors, which is a generalized version of Okada's (1996) model.
Tomohiko Kawamori
core
Dynamic Games with Almost Perfect Information [PDF]
, 2015 This paper aims to solve two fundamental problems on finite or infinite horizon dynamic games with perfect or almost perfect information. Under some mild conditions, we prove (1) the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria in general dynamic games with ...
He, Wei, Sun, Yeneng
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Tournaments with Midterm Reviews [PDF]
, 2006 In many tournaments investments are made over time and conducting a review only once at the end, or also at points midway through, is a strategic decision of the tournament designer.
Gershkov, Alex, Perry, Motty
core +3 more sources
The Manchester School, Volume 94, Issue 2, Page 234-248, March 2026.ABSTRACT This study examines endogenous choices of competition strategies in a vertically related mixed market in which an integrated public firm and a downstream firm, subject to forward passive ownership (FPO) by an input supplier, may engage in R&D investment.
Lili Xu, Yidan Zhang, Sang‐Ho Lee
wiley +1 more source
Bargaining over Strategies of Non-Cooperative Games
Games, 2015 We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. The agreement reached by players at the end of the bargaining process is the strategy profile that they will play in the original non-cooperative game.
Giuseppe Attanasi +3 more
doaj +1 more source
Resource Management Framework Based on the Stackelberg Game in Vehicular Edge Computing
Complexity, 2020 With the emergence and development of the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), quick response time and ultralow delay are required. Cloud computing services are unfavorable for reducing delay and response time.
Guang-Shun Li +5 more
doaj +1 more source
One - Memory in Repeated Games [PDF]
We study the extent to which equilibrium payo®s of discounted repeated games can be obtained by 1 { memory strategies. First, we present robust examples of games in which there is a subgame perfect equilibrium payo® pro¯le that cannot be obtained by any ...
Barlo, Mehmet, Carmona, Guilherme
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Markov Equilibria in Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games [PDF]
, 2004 Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990) show that a simple homogeneous market with exogenous matching has continuum of (non-competitive) perfect equilibria, but the unique Markov perfect equilibrium is competitive.
Gale, Douglas, Sabourian, Hamid
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