Results 101 to 110 of about 26,202 (266)
Organizational Design With Portable Skills
Journal of Economics &Management Strategy, Volume 35, Issue 1, Page 196-216, Spring 2026.ABSTRACT Workers learn from the tasks they perform, and in the process, they accumulate human capital that is potentially portable. Companies that cannot commit to specific task allocations may assign employees to tasks that reduce retention costs and do not maximize productivity.
Luca Picariello
wiley +1 more source
Cyclic Pricing by a Durable Goods Monopolist: Corrigendum [PDF]
In this paper we make a new analysis of the model presented in Conlisk, Gerstner and Sobel (1984). They propose a model in discrete time, such that at each period a new cohort of agents enters the market –each cohort is composed by two types of agents ...
César L. Guerrero Luchtenberg
core
Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2002 First we show that for wealth-constrained agents who may commit an act twice the optimal sanctions are the offender's entire wealth for the first and zero for the second crime. Then we ask the question whether this decreasing sanction scheme is subgame perfect (time consistent), i.e., does a rent-seeking government stick to this sanction scheme after ...
openaire +4 more sources
Tactical Refereeing and Signaling by Publishing
Kyklos, Volume 79, Issue 1, Page 172-182, February 2026.ABSTRACT Peer review is usually conducted to allocate limited resources, such as the budget of a funder or the pages of a journal. Limited capacity may bias peer evaluations, precisely because approving a peer's worthy project consumes capacity, jeopardizing the referee's own project's chances.
Sergey V. Popov
wiley +1 more source
A Multiperiod Equilibrium Pricing Model
Journal of Applied Mathematics, 2014 We propose an equilibrium pricing model in a dynamic multiperiod stochastic framework with uncertain income. There are one tradable risky asset (stock/commodity), one nontradable underlying (temperature), and also a contingent claim (weather derivative ...
Minsuk Kwak +2 more
doaj +1 more source
On the Provision of International Public Goods in Dynamic Open Economies
Review of International Economics, Volume 34, Issue 1, Page 198-218, February 2026.ABSTRACT This study develops a dynamic two‐country model with an international public good, the stock of which positively affects the productivity of the private‐goods sectors in each country, and the evolution of the stock is determined by each country's voluntary contribution in the form of public investment. Two scenarios are examined: A cooperative
Akihiko Yanase
wiley +1 more source
Subgame perfect implementation: A new result [PDF]
This paper concerns what will happen if quantum mechanics is concerned in subgame perfect implementation. The main result is: When additional conditions are satisfied, the traditional characterization on subgame perfect implementation shall be amended by
Wu, Haoyang
core +1 more source
Providing Public Goods Without Strong Sanctioning Institutions [PDF]
, 2007 This paper proposes a simple mechanism aimed to establish positive contributions to public goods in the absence of powerful institutions to sanction free-riders.
Gerber, Anke, Wichardt, Philipp C.
core +2 more sources
The Simple Geometry of Perfect Information Games [PDF]
Perfect information games have a particularly simple structure of equilibria in the associated normal form. For generic such games each of the finitely many connected components of Nash equilibria is contractible. For every perfect information game there
Demichelis, Stefano +2 more
core
Incentive Stackelberg Mean-payoff Games [PDF]
, 2015 We introduce and study incentive equilibria for multi-player meanpayoff games. Incentive equilibria generalise well-studied solution concepts such as Nash equilibria and leader equilibria (also known as Stackelberg equilibria).
Deepak, M. S. Krishna +4 more
core +2 more sources