Results 151 to 160 of about 26,202 (266)
Existence of equilibria in repeated games with long-run payoffs. [PDF]
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A, 2022 Ashkenazi-Golan G +3 more
europepmc +1 more source
Learning to Perfect Manipulation: Implications for Fertility, Savings, and Old-Age Social Security [PDF]
In this paper we consider an overlapping gnerations model with endogenous fertility and two-sided altruism and show the limitations of applying commonly used open loop Nash equilibrium in characterizing equilibrium transfers from parents to children in ...
Lakshmi K Raut
core
A Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Reinforcement Learning Approach to Time-inconsistent Problems [PDF]
, 2021 Nixie S. Lesmana, Chi Seng Pun
openalex +1 more source
Patients' free choice of physicians is not always good. [PDF]
Health Econ, 2021 Li X, Li X, Waibel C.
europepmc +1 more source
Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games [PDF]
We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for observed outcomes in extensive game forms, in which preferences are unobserved, to be rationalized first, partially, as a Nash equilibrium and then, fully, as the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Thus,
Indrajit Ray, Susan Snyder
core
Subgame Perfect Equilibria of Sequential Matching Games [PDF]
, 2018 Yasushi Kawase +2 more
openalex +1 more source
Subgame Solving in Adversarial Team Games
, 2022 In adversarial team games, a team of players sequentially faces a team of adversaries. These games are the simplest setting with multiple players where cooperation and competition coexist, and it is known that the information asymmetry among the team members makes equilibrium approximation computationally hard.
Zhang, Brian Hu +6 more
openaire +1 more source
Country versus pharmaceutical company interests for hepatitis C treatment. [PDF]
Health Care Manag Sci, 2022 Lothan R, Gutman N, Yamin D.
europepmc +1 more source
Wage bargaining with non-stationary preferences under strike decision [PDF]
In this paper, we present a non-cooperative wage bargaining model in which preferences of both parties, a union and a firm, are expressed by the sequences of discount rates varying in time.
Agnieszka Rusinowska, Ahmet Ozkardas
core
Enumerating rights: more is not always better. [PDF]
Public Choice, 2023 Ball S, Dave C, Dodds S.
europepmc +1 more source