Results 11 to 20 of about 26,202 (266)
Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Timing Games [PDF]
We introduce a notion of subgames for stochastic timing games and the related notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium in possibly mixed strategies. While a good notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium for continuous-time games is not available in general, we argue that our model is the appropriate version for timing games. We show that the notion coincides
Frank Riedel, Jan-Henrik Steg
semanticscholar +9 more sources
Subgame-perfect $$\epsilon $$ ϵ -equilibria in perfect information games with sigma-discrete discontinuities [PDF]
Multi-player perfect information games are known to admit a subgame-perfect $$\epsilon $$ϵ-equilibrium, for every $$\epsilon >0$$ϵ>0, under the condition that every player’s payoff function is bounded and continuous on the whole set of plays.
János Flesch, Arkadi Predtetchinski
openalex +2 more sources
Symmetric Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Resource Allocation
We analyze symmetric protocols to rationally coordinate on an asymmetric, efficient allocation in an infinitely repeated N-agent, C-resource allocation problems. (Bhaskar 2000) proposed one way to achieve this in 2-agent, 1-resource allocation games:
Ludek Cigler, B. Faltings
semanticscholar +3 more sources
In this paper we provide an exact non-cooperative foundation of the Nash solution via a unique (weakly) subgame perfect equilibrium payoff vector in a two-person bargaining game, which is a modification of the well-known alternate offer game by ...
Papatya Duman, Walter Trockel
doaj +2 more sources
Fairness in the multi-proposer-multi-responder ultimatum game. [PDF]
The Ultimatum Game is conventionally formulated in the context of two players. Nonetheless, real-life scenarios often entail community interactions among numerous individuals.
Hana Krakovská +2 more
doaj +2 more sources
We consider n-person pure bargaining games in which the space of feasible payoffs is constructed via a normal form differential game. At the beginning of the game the agents bargain over strategies to be played over an infinite time horizon. An initial
Simon Hoof
doaj +2 more sources
Generalized Backward Induction: Justification for a Folk Algorithm [PDF]
I introduce axiomatically infinite sequential games that extend Kuhn’s classical framework. Infinite games allow for (a) imperfect information, (b) an infinite horizon, and (c) infinite action sets.
Marek Mikolaj Kaminski
doaj +3 more sources
Subgame solving without common knowledge [PDF]
In imperfect-information games, subgame solving is significantly more challenging than in perfect-information games, but in the last few years, such techniques have been developed. They were the key ingredient to the milestone of superhuman play in no-limit Texas hold'em poker.
Brian Hu Zhang, Tüomas Sandholm
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Subgame perfect implementation: A new result [PDF]
This paper concerns what will happen if quantum mechanics is concerned in subgame perfect implementation. The main result is: When additional conditions are satisfied, the traditional characterization on subgame perfect implementation shall be amended by virtue of a quantum stage mechanism.
Haoyang Wu
openalex +5 more sources
On refinements of subgame perfect $$\epsilon $$ϵ-equilibrium [PDF]
The concept of subgame perfect $$\epsilon $$ϵ-equilibrium ($$\epsilon $$ϵ-SPE), where $$\epsilon $$ϵ is an error-term, has in recent years emerged as a prominent solution concept for perfect information games of infinite duration.
J. Flesch, A. Predtetchinski
semanticscholar +3 more sources

