Results 31 to 40 of about 26,202 (266)
Subgame-perfection in free transition games [PDF]
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Flesch J. +3 more
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Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Discounted Stochastic Games [PDF]
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Mitri Kitti
semanticscholar +4 more sources
Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Majoritarian Bargaining [PDF]
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P. Jean-Jacques Herings +2 more
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Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities [PDF]
I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal-form games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is a nonempty, complete lattice—in particular, subgame-perfect Nash equilibria exist.
Echenique, Federico
core +2 more sources
Network Externalities and Downstream Collusion under Asymmetric Costs: A Note
This paper considers the collusive stability of downstream competition in a vertical market with network externalities and cost asymmetry. A dynamic collusion game is constructed, and backward induction is employed to solve the subgame perfect Nash ...
Jen-Yao Lee +2 more
doaj +1 more source
Optimal Segmentation over a Generalized Customer Distribution
This paper investigates the impact of consumer preferences on the intensity of competition for companies in a duopoly market. A classical Hotelling’s competition problem will be different if consumers are allowed to distribute non-uniformly.
Tsung-Yin Ou, Yenming J. Chen
doaj +1 more source
On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules
Abreu and Sen (J Econ Theory 50(2):285–299, 1990) provide a necessary condition, called Condition α\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs}
M. R. Sanver, Matías Núñez
semanticscholar +1 more source
Sustainable Cooperation in a Bicriteria Game of Renewable Resource Extraction
We study a multi-objective finite-horizon game model of renewable, common resource extraction where the players have two separate objectives (one is economic success; the other describes the players’ environmental concern).
Denis Kuzyutin, Nadezhda Smirnova
doaj +1 more source
Iterated weak dominance and subgame dominance [PDF]
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
openaire +5 more sources
Programming and Verifying Subgame-Perfect Mechanisms [PDF]
An extension of the WHILE-language is developed for programming game-theoretic mechanisms involving multiple agents. Examples of such mechanisms include auctions, voting procedures, and negotiation protocols. A structured operational semantics is provided in terms of extensive games of almost perfect information.
openaire +2 more sources

