Results 41 to 50 of about 26,202 (266)
Delay to Deal: Bargaining with Indivisibility and Round-Dependent Transfer
Games, 2023 We examine a bargaining game in which players cannot make arbitrary offers. Instead, players alternately decide whether to accept or delay, and are rewarded with an indivisible portion and a perishable transfer that depends on the round.
Jijian Fan
doaj +1 more source
On the existence of weak subgame perfect equilibria [PDF]
Foundations of Software Science and Computation Structure, 2016 We study multi-player turn-based games played on a directed graph, where the number of players and vertices can be infinite. An outcome is assigned to every play of the game.
V. Bruyère +3 more
semanticscholar +1 more source
Joint beamforming and power control algorithm for cognitive MIMO broadcast channels via game theory
EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking, 2017 In this paper, we present a game-theoretic approach for the purpose of deriving the problem of joint beamforming and power control in cognitive radio (CR) multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) broadcast channels (CR MIMO-BCs), where the primary users ...
Shunlan Zhang, Ju Ni, Qing Peng
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The Decision Whether to Hire Managers in a Mixed Duopoly with State-Owned and Labor-Managed Firms [PDF]
International Journal of Management, Accounting and Economics, 2020 This paper considers a mixed duopoly model in which a state-owned firm competes with a labor-managed firm. The timing of this game is as follows. In the first stage, each firm decides whether or not to hire a manager.
Kazuhiro Ohnishi
doaj
The Inefficiency of Nash and Subgame Perfect Equilibria for Network Routing
Mathematics of Operations Research, 2019 This paper provides new bounds on the quality of equilibria in finite congestion games with affine cost functions, specifically for atomic network routing games. It is well known that the price of anarchy equals exactly 5/2 in general.
J. Correa +3 more
semanticscholar +1 more source
Robustness of Subgame Perfect Implementation
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016 In this paper we consider the robustness of subgame perfect implementation in situations when the preferences of players are almost perfectly known. More precisely, we consider a class of information perturbations where in each state of the world players know their own preferences with certainty and receive almost perfectly informative signals about ...
Peter Eccles, Nora Wegner
openalex +2 more sources
Subgame Credible Nash Equilibrium
, 2022 We propose the Subgame Credible Nash Equilibrium (SCNE), a refinement of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) for multi-stage games. SCNE retains the internal credibility requirement of SPNE -- equilibrium behavior in every subgame -- and adds an external credibility requirement across equivalent subgames: whenever a player's prescribed continuation
openaire +2 more sources
A symbolic shortest path algorithm for computing subgame-perfect Nash equilibria
International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science, 2015 Consider games where players wish to minimize the cost to reach some state. A subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium can be regarded as a collection of optimal paths on such games.
Góngora Pedro A., Rosenblueth David A.
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Endogenous timing in a vertically differentiated mixed duopoly with Cournot competition
Archives of Control Sciences, 2016 This paper compares the equilibrium outcomes under simultaneous and sequential output setting in a mixed duopoly in a vertically differentiated market. When the timing of the output game is determined endogenously, it is shown that simultaneous play in ...
Feng Leidong, Gu Mengdi
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Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations*
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2012 Abstract We consider the robustness of extensive form mechanisms to deviations from common knowledge about the state of nature, which we refer to as information perturbations . First, we show that even under arbitrarily small information perturbations the Moore-Repullo mechanism does not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation and
Aghion, Philippe +4 more
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