Results 51 to 60 of about 26,202 (266)
Simulation of the Stackelberg–Hotelling Game
GamesThis work studies the Hotelling game with sequential choice of prices, that is, the Stackelberg–Hotelling (SHOT) game. The game is studied through numerical simulation, which provides the subgame perfect equilibrium solution not only in the unrestricted ...
Luis Garcia-Perez +3 more
doaj +1 more source
Games, 2019 Refinements of the Nash equilibrium have followed the strategy of extending the idea of subgame perfection to incomplete information games. This has been achieved by appropriately restricting beliefs at unreached information sets.
Asha Sadanand
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On a Simplified Method of Defining Characteristic Function in Stochastic Games
Mathematics, 2020 In the paper, we propose a new method of constructing cooperative stochastic game in the form of characteristic function when initially non-cooperative stochastic game is given. The set of states and the set of actions for any player is finite.
Elena Parilina, Leon Petrosyan
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Backward Induction for Repeated Games [PDF]
Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science, 2018 We present a method of backward induction for computing approximate subgame perfect Nash equilibria of infinitely repeated games with discounted payoffs. This uses the selection monad transformer, combined with the searchable set monad viewed as a notion
Jules Hedges
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Solving Imperfect Information Games Using Decomposition [PDF]
, 2014 Decomposition, i.e. independently analyzing possible subgames, has proven to be an essential principle for effective decision-making in perfect information games. However, in imperfect information games, decomposition has proven to be problematic.
Bowling, Michael +2 more
core +2 more sources
The RAND Journal of Economics, EarlyView.ABSTRACT We propose a tractable model of asymmetric platform oligopoly with logit demand in which users from two distinct groups are subject to within‐group and cross‐group network effects and decide which platform to join. We characterize the equilibrium when platforms manage user access by setting participation fees for each user group.
Martin Peitz, Susumu Sato
wiley +1 more source
The Unanimity Rule under a Two-Agent Fixed Sequential Order Voting
Games, 2022 This paper studies how the cost of delay and voting order affect agents’ decisions in a unanimity voting mechanism. Specifically, we consider two-voter conclaves with commonly known preferences over two alternatives, the cost of delay, and the following ...
Marina Bánnikova +1 more
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The RAND Journal of Economics, EarlyView.ABSTRACT We study a long‐horizon, oligopolistic market with random shocks to demand that can be arbitraged by two storage operators with finite capacity. This problem applies to any storable commodity—that is, most commodities. Because the arbitrage spread is so sensitive to market power, storage operators face strong incentives to restrain quantities ...
Sergei Balakin, Guillaume Roger
wiley +1 more source
Stable Price Dispersion under Heterogeneous Buyer Consideration
The RAND Journal of Economics, EarlyView.ABSTRACT We study the pricing of homogeneous products sold to customers who consider different sets of suppliers. We identify prices that are stable in the sense that no firm wishes to undercut a rival or to raise its price when rivals are able to respond by offering special deals.
David P. Myatt, David Ronayne
wiley +1 more source
5G Price Competition with Social Equilibrium Optimality for Social Networks
Applied Sciences, 2022 Due to the leaps of progress in the 5G telecommunication industry, commodity pricing and consumer choice are frequently subject to change and competition in the search for optimal supply and demand.
Yuhao Feng +3 more
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