Results 81 to 90 of about 26,202 (266)

Simple Efficient Contracts in Complex Environments [PDF]

open access: yes, 2008
The paper studies a general model of hold-up in a setting encompassing the models of Segal (1999) and Che and Hausch (1999) among others. It is shown that if renegotiation is modelled as an infinite-horizon non-cooperative bargaining game then, with a ...
Evans, RA
core   +1 more source

Profitability of private brands of e‐commerce platforms offering competing national brands under agency selling

open access: yesInternational Transactions in Operational Research, EarlyView.
Abstract This paper investigates the impact of a private brand (PB) introduction by an e‐commerce platform. Contrary to previous research, the platform allows competing manufacturers to sell their national brands (NBs) directly to consumers for an agency fee. Our game‐theoretic analysis allows us to derive the following key insights.
Salma Karray, Simon P. Sigué
wiley   +1 more source

A Multi-Step Model for Pie Cutting with Random Offers

open access: yesMathematics
The problem of dividing a pie between two persons is considered. An arbitration procedure for dividing the pie is proposed, in which the arbitrator is a random number generator. In this procedure, the arbitrator makes an offer to the players at each step,
Vladimir Mazalov, Vladimir Yashin
doaj   +1 more source

Bank Capital and Misconduct Incentives

open access: yesJournal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This paper studies large banks' incentives to engage in misconduct by abusing their dominant position in the market for loans and by mis‐selling an add‐on financial product to depositors. We draw new connections between stability‐focused prudential regulation and misconduct by studying the impact of higher capital requirements on misconduct ...
Jacob Seifert
wiley   +1 more source

BACKWARD INDUCTION: MERITS AND FLAWS

open access: yesStudies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric, 2017
Backward induction (BI) was one of the earliest methods developed for solving finite sequential games with perfect information. It proved to be especially useful in the context of Tom Schelling’s ideas of credible versus incredible threats.
Kamiński Marek M.
doaj   +1 more source

Investment and Consumption with Regime-Switching Discount Rates [PDF]

open access: yes, 2013
This paper considers the problem of consumption and investment in a financial market within a continuous time stochastic economy. The investor exhibits a change in the discount rate. The investment opportunities are a stock and a riskless account.
Pirvu, Traian, Zhang, Huayue
core  

Robust Incentives [PDF]

open access: yes, 2007
In this paper we consider a moral hazard problem, in which the agent after receiving his wage contract but before undertaking the costly effort can borrow on his future wage earnings.
Reiche, Sonje
core   +2 more sources

Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions

open access: yesGames and Economic Behavior, 2002
This paper provides simple four-stage game forms that fully implement a large class of two-person bargaining solutions in subgame-perfect equilibrium. The solutions that can be implemented by our game forms are those that maximize a monotonic and quasi-concave function of utilities after normalizing each agent's utility function so that the maximum ...
openaire   +3 more sources

Buyer Power and the Effect of Vertical Integration on Innovation

open access: yesJournal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Our article investigates the impact of vertical integration (without foreclosure) on innovation. We compare cases where either (i) two manufacturers or (ii) a manufacturer and a vertically integrated retailer invest. Then, the independent manufacturer(s) and the retailer bargain over nonlinear contracts before selling to consumers.
Claire Chambolle, Morgane Guignard
wiley   +1 more source

A Note on Stabilizing Cooperation in the Centipede Game

open access: yesGames, 2020
In the much-studied Centipede Game, which resembles the Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma, two players successively choose between (1) cooperating, by continuing play, or (2) defecting and terminating play.
Steven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour
doaj   +1 more source

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