Results 41 to 50 of about 379 (172)
Contextuality as supervenience
Proceedings of the Amsterdam Colloquium, 2007 Wilfrid Hodges proposes an explication of the context principle. I show that the explication is, in a certain respect, too weak and propose to replace it by the principle that meaning supervenes on contribution, which however, entails Hodges’ principle.
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From Moral Supervenience to Moral Contingentism (In One Easy Step!)
Analytic Philosophy, Volume 67, Issue 3, Page 224-237, September 2026.ABSTRACT According to the Divide & Conquer (DC) strategy (Fogal and Risberg 2020) for explaining moral supervenience, the modal covariation between moral and natural properties can be partly explained by appeal to pure moral principles. Bhogal (2022) has recently argued that DC fails.
Alexios Stamatiadis‐Bréhier
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Supervenience and Basic Christian Beliefs
Zygon, 2001 A field‐oriented interpretation of Whiteheadian societies of actual occasions, when used to explain the notion of “strong supervenience” as applied to the mind‐brain problem, allows one to claim that not only higher‐level properties such as ...
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Normative Vagueness: Metaethics
Philosophy Compass, Volume 21, Issue 4, July/August 2026.ABSTRACT The apparent vagueness of normative predicates such as “permissible,” “wrong,” and “responsible” raises a number of intriguing questions and has prompted a growing body of philosophical literature. In this article, I review recent metaethical discussions on normative vagueness.
Kaj André Zeller
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Metaethics and the Functions of Moral Language
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 113, Issue 1, Page 74-87, July 2026.ABSTRACT Metaethics has long included debates about the function of moral discourse. Some have argued that moral statements express our attitudes, others that they serve as prescriptions for how to act, still others that they describe moral facts or properties.
Amie L. Thomasson
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Parity and the Permissivism Puzzle: A Defense of Epistemic Options
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 113, Issue 1, Page 233-247, July 2026.ABSTRACT Moral philosophers generally affirm that there are moral options: a single person sometimes has multiple morally permissible actions at a time. But epistemologists generally deny that there are epistemic options: a single person never has multiple epistemically permissible doxastic attitudes at a time. This asymmetry is striking.
Chris Tucker, Elizabeth Jackson
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The Fractal Self and the Organization of Nature: The Daoist Sage and Chaos Theory
Zygon, 1999 The interconnections between self and surroundings in Daoist thought have been explored in the past in a variety of contexts. This paper, however, explores the Daoist version of the relational self from the general perspective of chaos theory and, more ...
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Superweniencja – pytanie o trywialność [PDF]
Avant, 2011 When it comes to the mind-body problem, different kinds of physicalism were the most popular approaches among philosophers. The presence of anomalous monism with its lack of (the) laws concerning mental events and multiple realizability led to a doubt ...
Błażej Brzostek
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Quine, Davidson, Relative Essentialism and the Question of Being
Open Philosophy, 2018 Relative essentialism, the view that multiple objects about which there are distinct de re modal truths can occupy the same space at the same time, is a metaphysical view that dissolves a number of metaphysical issues.
Wheeler Samuel C.
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