Results 61 to 70 of about 10,262 (219)

Supervenience and Basic Christian Beliefs

open access: yesZygon, 2001
A field‐oriented interpretation of Whiteheadian societies of actual occasions, when used to explain the notion of “strong supervenience” as applied to the mind‐brain problem, allows one to claim that not only higher‐level properties such as ...
doaj   +2 more sources

What Kind of Modality Does the Materialist Need For His Supervenience Claim? [PDF]

open access: yes, 2009
Materialists who do not deny the existence of mental phenomena usually claim that the mental supervenes on the physical, i.e. that there cannot be a change in the mental life of a man without there being a change in the man"s body.
von Wachter, Daniel
core  

Probability and Nonlocality in Many Minds Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics [PDF]

open access: yes, 2001
We argue that a certain type of many minds (and many worlds) interpretations of quantum mechanics due to Lockwood (and Deutsch) do not provide a coherent interpretation of the quantum mechanical probabilistic algorithm.
Hemmo, M., Pitowsky, I.
core   +4 more sources

Model‐Based Semantics: Doing Without Meaning Constitution

open access: yesMetaphilosophy, Volume 57, Issue 1-2, Page 103-118, January 2026.
Abstract This paper introduces a model‐based account of meaning, arguing that meaning properties reside in models rather than in the external world. Building on this view, it explores how such an instrumentalist framework can engage critically with various concerns raised by Wittgenstein, Quine, and Kripke[nstein]—each of whom voiced scepticism toward ...
Pietro Salis
wiley   +1 more source

Facing Up to David Chalmers’ Philosophy of Mind: the General Overview [PDF]

open access: yes, 2017
According to Tim Crane, “the ’hard problem’ of consciousness is supposed to be the real heart of the mind-body problem in today’s philosophy”. The idea of the problem can be expressed in the following way: Why are the physical processes in our brain ...
Leonov, Andrii
core  

Semantic externalism without thought experiments [PDF]

open access: yes, 2017
Externalism is the thesis that the contents of intentional states and speech acts are not determined by the way the subjects of those states or acts are internally. It is a widely accepted but not entirely uncontroversial thesis.
Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani
core   +1 more source

Emergent moral non‐naturalism

open access: yesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 111, Issue 3, Page 1037-1056, November 2025.
Abstract This paper introduces emergent moral non‐naturalism, which holds that moral properties depend on descriptive properties and normative bridge principles for their instantiation, where these principles specify instantiation conditions of moral properties in terms of descriptive properties.
Umut Baysan
wiley   +1 more source

What do you mean “This isn’t the question”? [PDF]

open access: yes, 2017
This is a contribution to the symposium on Tim Scanlon’s Being Realistic about Reasons. We have two aims here: First, we ask for more details about Scanlon’s meta-metaphysical view, showing problems with salient clarifications.
Enoch, David, McPherson, Tristram
core   +1 more source

Appreciating the Evidence

open access: yesPhilosophical Issues, Volume 35, Issue 1, Page 115-125, October 2025.
ABSTRACT Having evidence does not in itself make a doxastic attitude justified even if the evidence supports the attitude in question. Plausibly, one must also appreciate the support one's evidence provides for the doxastic attitude. Although such appreciation seems central to the picture of justification offered by Evidentialism, its nature has been ...
Kevin McCain
wiley   +1 more source

Quine, Davidson, Relative Essentialism and the Question of Being

open access: yesOpen Philosophy, 2018
Relative essentialism, the view that multiple objects about which there are distinct de re modal truths can occupy the same space at the same time, is a metaphysical view that dissolves a number of metaphysical issues.
Wheeler Samuel C.
doaj   +1 more source

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