Results 221 to 230 of about 749,119 (303)

When Business Breaks the Rules: The Value of a Criminology‐Informed “Organizational” Perspective for the Regulation of White‐Collar and Corporate Crimes

open access: yesRegulation &Governance, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This article argues that if the aspiration is to enhance regulatory and governance responses to white‐collar and corporate crimes, consideration of the organization of these offending behaviors must be central to the scholarly, practice, and policy discussion.
Nicholas Lord, Michael Levi
wiley   +1 more source

Competing Under Oath: Can Honesty Pledges Reduce Cheating in Competitive Environments?

open access: yesRegulation &Governance, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT People frequently compete with one another for awards, benefits, contracts, positions, or roles. One of the regulatory challenges in these contexts lies in preventing people from making dishonest claims to win such competitions. Honesty pledges, asking people to commit to ethical behavior ex ante, have been found to reduce cheating under non ...
Ronit Montal‐Rosenberg   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

Are Rule Violating Corporations Specialist or Generalist Perpetrators? A Quantitative Exploration Based on Regulatory Inspection Data

open access: yesRegulation &Governance, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT The present study examines diversity in corporate offending. Corporations can be diverse or rather specialized in their pattern of rule violating behavior. Offending diversity (or crime mix) constitutes an important dimension of the criminal career and different theories of offending lead to different predictions with regard to the extent of ...
Marieke H. A. Kluin   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

Supervising Your In‐Group? How Social Identification Shapes Financial Sector Regulatory Leniency

open access: yesRegulation &Governance, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Both practitioners and governance scholars recognize the importance of external oversight, especially in regulated industries like the financial sector. However, the failure of financial sector regulators and enforcement officials (supervisors) to act is often cited as a primary cause of ineffective governance.
Dennis Veltrop   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

Beyond Universal Cooperation: Domain‐Specific Mechanisms of Citizen Compliance Across Taxation, Health, and Environmental Regulation

open access: yesRegulation &Governance, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This study challenges the assumption that cooperation mechanisms are uniform across policy domains by examining how trust and social norms influence personal commitment to cooperate (PCC) in taxation, public health, and environmental protection. Using data from 15 countries, we identify systematic differences that question universal regulatory
Michaela Assouline   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

Delegation to artificial intelligence can increase dishonest behaviour. [PDF]

open access: yesNature
Köbis N   +7 more
europepmc   +1 more source

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