Results 41 to 50 of about 6,618 (225)
Defectors, not norm violators, are punished by third-parties [PDF]
Punishment of defectors and cooperators is prevalent when their behaviour deviates from the social norm. Why atypical behaviour is more likely to be punished than typical behaviour remains unclear. One possible proximate explanation is that individuals simply dislike norm violators.
Jonathan Bone +2 more
openaire +2 more sources
The Dark Side of Altruistic Third-Party Punishment [PDF]
This article experimentally studies punishment from unaffected third parties in ten different games. The authors show that third-party punishment exhibits several features that are arguably undesirable. First, third parties punish strongly a decider if she chooses a socially efficient or a Pareto efficient allocation and becomes the richest party as a ...
López Pérez, Raúl +1 more
openaire +3 more sources
High strength-of-ties and low mobility enable the evolution of third-party punishment. [PDF]
Roos P, Gelfand M, Nau D, Carr R.
europepmc +2 more sources
Third-party punishment and third-party compensation are primary responses to observed norms violations. Previous studies mostly investigated these behaviors in gain rather than loss context, and few study made direct comparison between these two ...
Yingjie Liu +6 more
doaj +1 more source
Gratitude increases third-party punishment
Third-party punishment occurs when a perpetrator of a transgression is punished by another person who was not directly affected by the transgression (i.e., a third-party). Given gratitude’s demonstrated ability to enhance both cooperation and the value people place on future-rewards, its capacity to increase third-party punishment was investigated.
Jonathan Vayness +2 more
openaire +3 more sources
Publisher Correction: Third-party punishment-like behavior in a rat model. [PDF]
Mikami K +13 more
europepmc +2 more sources
Social influence on third-party punishment: An experiment [PDF]
Abstract We study the effect of social influence on agents’ decisions to engage in costly decentralized third-party punishment. In a laboratory experiment, participants play a modified Dictator game with third-party punishment and we elicit punishment decisions both in isolation and after providing information about peers’ average punishment. Results
Fabbri, Marco, Carbonara, Emanuela
openaire +3 more sources
The intergroup bias in third-party fairness maintenance includes two components: ingroup love and outgroup hate. Previous studies revealed that intergroup bias could be alleviated by high social identity complexity.
Zhuang Li, Gengdan Hu, Qiangqiang Li
doaj +1 more source
Third-party punishers are rewarded, but third-party helpers even more so. [PDF]
Punishers can benefit from a tough reputation, where future partners cooperate because they fear repercussions. Alternatively, punishers might receive help from bystanders if their act is perceived as just and other-regarding. Third-party punishment of selfish individuals arguably fits these conditions, but it is not known whether third-party punishers
Raihani, NJ, Bshary, R
openaire +5 more sources
Creating sanctioning norms in the lab: the influence of descriptive norms in third-party punishment
Third-party punishment is a form of peer-to-peer sanctioning that is influenced by descriptive norms. The present study aims to investigate how aggregate peer punishment and the presence of a free rider who never punishes influences the formation of ...
Giannis Lois, Michèle Wessa
doaj +1 more source

