Results 71 to 80 of about 180,500 (306)
Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
Haake C-J, Klaus B. Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 399. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld; 2008.We consider two-sided matching markets with couples.
Klaus, B.E. +5 more
core +1 more source
Two-sided matching with one-sided preferences [PDF]
A stylized fact of most centralized matching markets (for example school choice problems is that participants tend to submit preference lists over a small number of potential matches. This paper is based on the premise that this fact provides additional information that can be used to match agents.
Guillaume Haeringer, Vincent Iehlé
openaire +2 more sources
KDM7A and KDM1A inhibition suppresses tumour promoting pathways in prostate cancer
Treatment resistance is a major challenge for patients with advanced prostate cancer. This study examined an alternative approach to target the major prostate cancer‐promoting pathway by targeting epigenetic factors, whose levels are higher in tumours.
Jennie N Jeyapalan +16 more
wiley +1 more source
A Multistage Two-Sided Matching Model in Interval-Valued Triangular Fuzzy Environments
In two-sided matching problems, accurately quantifying preference intensity using precise numerical values remains a significant challenge due to the inherent complexity and fuzziness of real-world decision-making.
Jian-min Qiao, Wan-bao Wu, Wo-yuan Li
doaj +1 more source
Matching Knowledge Suppliers and Demanders on a Digital Platform: A Novel Method
More knowledge service providers are using digital platforms to provide services, which operate under a different set of operating rules than the traditional service model.
Jing Chang, Hua Li, Bingzhen Sun
doaj +1 more source
Stability in one-sided matching markets [PDF]
The stable roommates problem may be unsolvable for sorne instances, therefore we study a relaxation, when it is allowed to form groups of any size (the stable partition problem). Two extensions of preferences over individuals to preferences over sets are
Cechlárová, Katarína +1 more
core
RNA profiling of circulating extracellular vesicles (EVs) from blood samples of men undergoing prostate biopsy identifies transcripts associated with clinically significant prostate cancer. Integrative analysis with public tumor datasets links EV‐derived gene signatures to tumor stage and progression‐free survival, highlighting CASP3, XRCC2, and RIT1 ...
Stefan Werner +14 more
wiley +1 more source
This study shows that lung adenocarcinomas exploit developmental branching morphogenesis to acquire a therapy resistant basal‐like tumour cell state. This process was found to be regulated by combined TP53 loss‐of‐function and type‐I interferon signalling, identifying a novel axis for biomarker and therapeutic target discovery.
Kamila J Bienkowska +13 more
wiley +1 more source
Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
Haake C-J, Klaus B. Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 372.
Klaus, B.E. +3 more
core +1 more source
Median stable matchings in two-sided markets [PDF]
We show that generalized median stable matchings exist in many-to-many matching markets when contracts are strong substitutes and satisfy the law of aggregate demand.
Peter Chen +3 more
openaire +3 more sources

