Results 11 to 20 of about 67 (64)
Econometrica, Volume 93, Issue 6, Page 2007-2042, November 2025.We study reputation formation where a long‐run player repeatedly observes private signals and takes actions. Short‐run players observe the long‐run player's past actions but not her past signals. The long‐run player can thus develop a reputation for playing a distribution over actions, but not necessarily for playing a particular mapping from signals ...
Daniel Luo, Alexander Wolitzky
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International Economic Review, Volume 66, Issue 4, Page 1487-1503, October 2025.ABSTRACT In this paper, I introduce a novel benchmark in games, super‐Nash performance, and a solution concept, optimin, whereby players maximize their minimal payoff under unilateral profitable deviations by other players. Optimin achieves super‐Nash performance in that, for every Nash equilibrium, there exists an optimin where each player not only ...
Mehmet S. Ismail
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Bargaining Foundations for Price Taking in Matching Markets
International Economic Review, Volume 66, Issue 4, Page 1561-1575, October 2025.ABSTRACT Agents make noncontractible investments before bargaining over who matches with whom and their terms of trade. An agent is a price taker when her investments do not change her potential partners' payoffs. This incentivizes socially optimal investments.
Matthew Elliott, Eduard Talamàs
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Market Allocations Under Conflation of Goods
International Economic Review, Volume 66, Issue 4, Page 1681-1691, October 2025.ABSTRACT We study competitive equilibria in exchange economies when a continuum of goods is conflated into a finite set of commodities. The design of conflation choices affects the allocation of scarce resources among agents, by constraining trading opportunities and shifting competitive pressures.
Niccolò Urbinati, Marco LiCalzi
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Finding Out Who You Are: A Self‐Exploration View of Education
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Volume 27, Issue 2, April 2025.ABSTRACT I study the optimal design of information in education. Students in my model have different priors about their talents and update their beliefs after receiving noisy signals about themselves. I show that the socially optimal signal structure depends only on the average priors of the participating students.
Sungmin Park
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Existence of equilibria in persuasion games with costly information acquisition
International Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 21, Issue 1, Page 52-63, March 2025.Abstract This paper studies public information disclosure in games with rationally inattentive players. We establish how the existence of an optimal sender's strategy depends on the nature of the receivers' information cost. When the receivers' cost is strongly Uniformly Posterior Separable (UPS), selecting the sender's most preferred equilibrium (SPE)
Alfonso Montes
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The Political Economy of Zero‐Sum Thinking
Econometrica, Volume 93, Issue 1, Page 41-70, January 2025.This paper offers a strategic rationale for zero‐sum thinking in elections. We show that asymmetric information and distributional considerations together make voters wary of policies supported by others. This force impels a majority of voters to support policies contrary to their preferences and information.
S. Nageeb Ali +2 more
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Dynamic economics with quantile preferences
Theoretical Economics, Volume 20, Issue 1, Page 353-425, January 2025.This paper studies a dynamic quantile model for intertemporal decisions under uncertainty, in which the decision maker maximizes the τ‐quantile of the stream of future utilities, for τ ∈ (0,1). We present two sets of contributions. First, we generalize existing results in directions that are important for applications.
Luciano de Castro +2 more
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RAZOR‐THIN MASS ELECTIONS WITH HIGH TURNOUT
International Economic Review, Volume 65, Issue 4, Page 1607-1624, November 2024.Abstract We argue that traditional voting models fail to fully explain the frequency of very close mass elections with high turnout. Instead, we model elections as a competition between incentive schemes to mobilize voters. We elucidate conditions under which parties might prefer close elections, as the potential to be pivotal motivates voters instead ...
David K. Levine, Cesar Martinelli
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Theoretical Economics, Volume 19, Issue 4, Page 1701-1755, November 2024.We present a unified duality approach to Bayesian persuasion. The optimal dual variable, interpreted as a price function on the state space, is shown to be a supergradient of the concave closure of the objective function at the prior belief. Strong duality holds when the objective function is Lipschitz continuous.
Piotr Dworczak, Anton Kolotilin
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