Results 21 to 30 of about 67 (64)
Fighting terrorism: How to position rapid response teams?
Abstract In light of recent terrorist attacks, we introduce and study a Stackelberg game between a government and a terrorist. In this game, the government positions a number of heavily‐armed rapid response teams on a line segment (e.g., a long boulevard or shopping avenue) and then the terrorist attacks a location with the highest potential impact of ...
Lotte van Aken +3 more
wiley +1 more source
This paper introduces and analyzes sequentially stable outcomes in extensive‐form games. An outcome ω is sequentially stable if, for any ε > 0 and any small enough perturbation of the players' behavior, there is an ε‐perturbation of the players' payoffs and a corresponding equilibrium with outcome close to ω.
Francesc Dilmé
wiley +1 more source
Existence and uniqueness of solutions to the Bellman equation in stochastic dynamic programming
In this paper, we develop a framework to analyze stochastic dynamic optimization problems in discrete time. We obtain new results about the existence and uniqueness of solutions to the Bellman equation through a notion of Banach contractions that generalizes known results for Banach and local contractions. We apply the results obtained to an endogenous
Juan Pablo Rincón‐Zapatero
wiley +1 more source
Stable matching in large markets with occupational choice
We introduce a model of large many‐to‐one matching markets with occupational choice where each individual can choose which side of the market to belong to. We show that stable matchings exist under mild assumptions; in particular, both complementarities and externalities can be accommodated.
Guilherme Carmona +1 more
wiley +1 more source
Vertical Mergers in Ecosystems with Consumer Hold‐Up*
An ecosystem comprises all downstream products that employ a certain upstream input. In many cases, final consumers make irreversible investments to join an ecosystem before downstream prices are set. By committing to buy products that use the specific ecosystem input, they are at risk of being held‐up.
Daniele Condorelli +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good
A buyer wishes to purchase a durable good from a seller who in each period chooses a mechanism under limited commitment. The buyer's value is binary and fully persistent. We show that posted prices implement all equilibrium outcomes of an infinite‐horizon, mechanism‐selection game.
Laura Doval, Vasiliki Skreta
wiley +1 more source
Dynamics of market making algorithms in dealer markets: Learning and tacit collusion
Abstract The widespread use of market‐making algorithms in electronic over‐the‐counter markets may give rise to unexpected effects resulting from the autonomous learning dynamics of these algorithms. In particular the possibility of “tacit collusion” among market makers has increasingly received regulatory scrutiny.
Rama Cont, Wei Xiong
wiley +1 more source
Promoting a reputation for quality
Abstract I model a firm that invests in the quality of its product and influences how that quality is disclosed. The firm can promote its product; at random intervals it can disclose quality for a cost. At low reputations, promotion allows a firm to reestablish itself and the firm invests to take advantage of this.
Daniel N Hauser
wiley +1 more source
Do not Blame Bellman: It Is Koopmans' Fault
We provide a unified approach to stochastic dynamic programming with recursive utility based on an elementary application of Tarski's fixed point theorem. We establish that the exclusive source of multiple values is the presence of multiple recursive utilities consistent with the given aggregator, each yielding a legitimate value of the recursive ...
Gaetano Bloise +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Debreu's social equilibrium existence theorem. [PDF]
Dasgupta PS, Maskin ES.
europepmc +1 more source

