Results 121 to 130 of about 315 (176)
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On Van Fraassen's Critique of Abductive Reasoning

Philosophical Quarterly, 1996
Adoptant l'attitude critique propre a A. Menuge, l'A. montre que ni l'argument du mauvais lot, ni l'argument de l'indifference, ni la conception de la non-observabilite, developpes par Van Fraassen contre le raisonnement adbuctif, ne parviennent a refuter le principe du privilege et l'approximation de la verite qui fondent l'empirisme ...
Stathis Psillos
exaly   +2 more sources

Reflections on reflection: Van Fraassen on belief

Synthese, 1994
In 'Belief and the Will', van Fraasssen employed a diachronic Dutch Book argument to support a counterintuitive principle called Reflection. Tere and subsequently van Fraassen has put forth Reflection as a linchpin for his views in epistemology and the philosophy of science, and for the voluntarism (first-person reports of subjective probability ...
Mitchell S. Green   +1 more
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Van Fraassen on Explanation

The Journal of Philosophy, 1987
AbstractCoauthored by Philip Kitcher, deals critically with the view – whose most influential proponent is Bas van Fraassen – that the traditional problems of scientific explanation can be resolved by means of pragmatic considerations alone. This approach, elaborated in 1980 in The Scientific Image , has found much favor among philosophers of science ...
Philip Kitcher, Wesley Salmon
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van Fraassen's Semanticism

PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 1984
Bas van Fraassen has formulated a semantical or model theoretic analysis of the structure of scientific theories. He contrasts his semantical approach with the syntactic approach of the logical positivists and argues that his theory is preferable on a number of grounds. My aims in this paper will be threefold.
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Full Belief and Probability: Comments on Van Fraassen

Dialogue, 1997
As van Fraassen pointed out in his opening remarks, Henry Kyburg's lottery paradox has long been known to raise difficulties in attempts to represent full belief as a probability greater than or equal to p, where p is some number less than 1. Recently, Patrick Maher has pointed out that to identify full belief with probability equal to 1 presents ...
Harper, William, Hajek, Alan
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Van Fraassen's Instrumentalism

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1985
In The Scientific Image [1980], Bas van Fraassen argues against a particular form of scientific realism and for a view of his own which he dubs constructive empiricism. The version of realism he intends to refute is the view that the aim of science is to construct theories that are literally true, and that to accept a scientific theory is to believe ...
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Van Fraassen's metaphysical move

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 1991
Abstract Various aspects of van Fraassen's constructive empiricism are discussed. His concept of observability is said to have opened few unresolvable dilemmas. It is because of the confusion between observable/non‐observable and testable/metaphysical distinctions.
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Van Fraassen on Preparation and Measurement

Philosophy of Science, 1996
Van Fraassen’s 1991 modal interpretation of Quantum Mechanics offers accounts of measurement and state preparation. I argue that both accounts overlook a class of interactions I call General Unitary Measurements, or GUMs. Ironically, GUMs are significant for van Fraassen’s account of measurement because they challenge it, and significant for his ...
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Van Fraassen's Unappreciated Realism

Philosophy of Science, 2003
What is not often noted about Bas van Fraassen's distinctive approach to the scientific realism issue is that constructive empiricism, as he defines it, seems to involve a distinctively realist stance in regard to large parts of natural science. This apparent defection from the ranks of his more uncompromisingly anti-realist colleagues raises many ...
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VAN FRAASSEN ON THE NATURE OF EMPIRICISM

Metaphilosophy, 2007
Abstract: A traditional view is that to be an empiricist is to hold a particular epistemological belief: something to the effect that knowledge must derive from experience. In his recent book The Empirical Stance, and in a number of other publications, Bas van Fraassen has disagreed, arguing that if empiricism is to be defensible it must instead be ...
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