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Medición científica entre la intervención y la representación

open access: yesValenciana, 2016
Se analiza la propuesta empirista de van Fraassen en torno a la medición científica considerando las objeciones hechas a las teorías representacionalistas de la medición, para argumentar que la medición es un proceso complejo iterativo en el que teoría y
Gilda Macedo Mira Andreu
doaj   +1 more source

O Voluntarismo de Van Fraassen

open access: yesPrincípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN), 2023
Em The Empirical Stance, van Fraassen propõe o voluntarismo de posturas epistêmicas: é racional tudo o que é racionalmente permitido, e apenas a incoerência é racionalmente proibida. O voluntarismo de posturas é uma concepção permissiva de racionalidade, que permite a um agente escolher qual postura epistêmica adotar, onde uma postura epistêmica é ...
openaire   +1 more source

Representation and abduction

open access: yesMind &Language, Volume 41, Issue 4, Page 520-525, September 2026.
It is commonly noted that representations are sometimes posited in order to explain behavior. Call this reasoning “abductive”. Edward Tolman used abductive reasoning as a basis for thinking that rats have a cognitive map. This reasoning sits uncomfortably with Egan's contention that representations—such as cognitive maps—are not explanatory, but are ...
Ken Aizawa
wiley   +1 more source

Las entidades observables en el empirismo constructivo de Van Fraassen [PDF]

open access: yes, 2010
Fil: Taghabue, Rosana. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina.James Ladyman en 2000 publica: What's Really Wrong Wlth ConsttuctIve Empiricism? Van Fraassen and the Metaphysics of Modality" donde ahonda en los problemas de la distinción observable ...
Taghabue, Rosana
core   +1 more source

What Voting Power Cannot Be

open access: yesNoûs, Volume 60, Issue 3, Page 548-562, September 2026.
ABSTRACT “Almost everyone,” Ronald Dworkin wrote in Sovereign Virtue, “assumes that democracy means equal voting power.” What, then, is voting power? The standard view defines it as the probability that a vote changes the outcome assuming that each possible combination of votes is equiprobable.
Daniel Wodak
wiley   +1 more source

From Moral Supervenience to Moral Contingentism (In One Easy Step!)

open access: yesAnalytic Philosophy, Volume 67, Issue 3, Page 224-237, September 2026.
ABSTRACT According to the Divide & Conquer (DC) strategy (Fogal and Risberg 2020) for explaining moral supervenience, the modal covariation between moral and natural properties can be partly explained by appeal to pure moral principles. Bhogal (2022) has recently argued that DC fails.
Alexios Stamatiadis‐Bréhier
wiley   +1 more source

Inference to the Best Explanation and van Fraassen’s Contextual Theory of Explanation: Reply to Park [PDF]

open access: yes, 2021
Seungbae Park argues that Bas van Fraassen’s rejection of inference to the best explanation (IBE) is problematic for his contextual theory of explanation because van Fraassen uses IBE to support the contextual theory. This paper provides a defense of van
Prasetya, Yunus
core   +2 more sources

Críticas a la distinción observacional - no observacional de Van Fraassen [PDF]

open access: yes, 2002
Fil: Velasco, Marisa. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales; Argentina.En este trabajo me propongo, luego de hacer un brevísimo repaso de las principales críticas que recibiera la distinción, centrarme en una de ellas e intentar ...
Velasco, Marisa
core   +1 more source

The Problem of Unobservable A Defense of Van Fraassen’s Distinction between Observable and Unobservable [PDF]

open access: yesMetaphysics, 2015
In constructive empiricism Van Fraassen intends to defend the epistemological distinction between truth and empirical adequacy as well as between cognitive belief and pragmatic acceptance, based on epistemological distinction between observable entities ...
Jahangir Moazzenzade   +1 more
doaj  

A Match Made in (Rational) Heaven? How Credences Relate to Probability Beliefs

open access: yesTheoria, Volume 92, Issue 4, August 2026.
ABSTRACT Much has been said about the relation between credences and beliefs. Surprisingly little, however, has been said about how credences more specifically relate to probability beliefs. In this paper, I will argue that they are normatively related. This proposal goes against belief‐first reductionism, which says that credences just are probability
Roman Heil
wiley   +1 more source

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