Results 41 to 50 of about 5,868 (183)
, 2019 In this chapter, we will explore the luck at issue in Gettier-styled counterexamples and the subsequent problem it poses to any viable reductive analysis of knowledge.
Church, Ian M.
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Noûs, EarlyView.ABSTRACT Virtue epistemology has long struggled with the “Creditability Dilemma”: how can knowledge gained through deference be creditable to the knower if it primarily depends on others’ cognitive work? We propose a novel solution by developing a telic account of doxastic deference as a distinctive kind of social‐epistemic performance.
J. Adam Carter, Jesper Kallestrup
wiley +1 more source
Robust Pluralism About Philosophical Progress
Philosophical Issues, EarlyView.ABSTRACT This article argues that there are two fundamentally different types of alethic and epistemic progress in philosophy. It is widely assumed that such progress is to be assessed by reference to the quantity or quality of philosophy's product (i.e., a type of output or outcome, such as true answers, coherent views, knowledge, or understanding ...
John Bengson +2 more
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Lassen sich epistemische Tugenden als eine Art ethische Tugenden verstehen?
Zeitschrift für Praktische PhilosophieIn diesem Beitrag geht es um die Frage, wie eine „intellektuelle Ethik“ aussehen müsste, in der der Begriff der Tugend eine zentrale Rolle spielt. Unter Tugendepistemolog:innen, die so einen Ansatz verfolgen, gibt es die Tendenz, epistemische Tugenden ...
Jens Kertscher
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For A Service Conception of Epistemic Authority: A Collective Approach [PDF]
, 2019 This paper attempts to provide a remedy to a surprising lacuna in the current discussion in the epistemology of expertise, namely the lack of a theory accounting for the epistemic authority of collective agents.
Croce, Michel
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Toward a “strong” normativity of fear in Hans Jonas and Aristotle
The Southern Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.Abstract What does it mean to say that one “ought” to undergo an emotion? In The Imperative of Responsibility, Hans Jonas provocatively asserts that twentieth‐century citizens “ought” to fear for the well‐being of future generations. I argue that Jonas's demand is not straightforwardly reducible to claims about the fittingness, expedience, or aretaic ...
Magnus Ferguson
wiley +1 more source
Fatalizm logiczny i teologiczny a przedwiedza Boża. Krytyka argumentu antyredukcyjnego Lindy Zagzebski [ Fatalism logical and teological and God’s foreknowledge. Discussion with Linda Zagzebski’s anti-reductive argument] [PDF]
Analiza i Egzystencja, 2014 The article presents arguments for theological and logical fatalism and analyzes the view that the theological fatalism can be reduced to or transformed into the logical one.
Dariusz Lukasiewicz
doaj
First Person and Third Person Reasons and Religious Epistemology [PDF]
, 2011 In this paper I argue that there are two kinds of epistemic reasons. One kind is irreducibly first personal -- what I call deliberative reasons. The other kind is third personal -- what I call theoretical reasons.
Zagzebski, Linda
core
Expert-oriented abilities vs. novice-oriented abilities: An alternative account of epistemic authority [PDF]
, 2018 According to a recent account of epistemic authority proposed by Linda Zagzebski (2012), it is rational for laypersons to believe on authority when they conscientiously judge that the authority is more likely to form true beliefs and avoid false ones ...
Carter +10 more
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