Results 41 to 50 of about 1,120 (141)

External‐World Skepticism and the New Ethics of Belief

open access: yesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 113, Issue 2, Page 285-297, September 2026.
ABSTRACT External‐world skepticism challenges, among other things, the epistemic credentials of beliefs about other people. Some external‐world skeptics deny that I know my loved ones exist; some claim that my belief that my loved ones exist is epistemically impermissible. However, abandoning this belief would be highly unattractive.
James Fritz
wiley   +1 more source

Virtudes intelectuais e justificação: duas teorias sobre o carácter cognitivo dos agentes epistêmicos [PDF]

open access: yes, 2013
Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Florianópolis, 2013Este trabalho tem como propósito principal discutir o uso da noção de virtude em teorias ...
Santos, Breno Ricardo Guimarães
core  

Toward a “strong” normativity of fear in Hans Jonas and Aristotle

open access: yesThe Southern Journal of Philosophy, Volume 64, Issue 3, Page 306-324, September 2026.
Abstract What does it mean to say that one “ought” to undergo an emotion? In The Imperative of Responsibility, Hans Jonas provocatively asserts that twentieth‐century citizens “ought” to fear for the well‐being of future generations. I argue that Jonas's demand is not straightforwardly reducible to claims about the fittingness, expedience, or aretaic ...
Magnus Ferguson
wiley   +1 more source

Linda Zagzebski sobre a insolubilidade dos Casos Gettier

open access: yes, 2015
Neste ensaio apresentaremos e discutiremos a posição de Linda Zagzebski sobre os casos Gettier. Não falaremos da solução zagzebskiana a tal problema, mas sim que os casos Gettier, segundo a filósofa, são inevitáveis devido a comum e razoável declaração ...
Mandeli, Alison Vander
core   +1 more source

We Do Not Know Propositions

open access: yesTheoria, Volume 92, Issue 4, August 2026.
ABSTRACT Contemporary epistemologists analysing knowledge take (true) propositions to be the object of knowledge. In this paper, I provide an argument for the claim that the object of knowledge is, in fact, the world. The propositions in propositional knowledge ascriptions merely describe the part of the world of which the subject is aware. Kent Bach's
Tess Dewhurst
wiley   +1 more source

The Role of Intellectual Virtues in the Practice of Humanistic Mental Health Counseling

open access: yesThe Journal of Humanistic Counseling, Volume 65, Issue 2, Page 104-112, July 2026.
ABSTRACT The function of intellectual virtues as a foundation for the development of excellence in the humanistic practice of clinical mental health counseling is explored. First, the unique characteristics of intellectual virtues are described. Second, 10 specific intellectual virtues are identified and briefly defined.
Mark S. Gerig
wiley   +1 more source

AI Epistemic Disengagement and Consumer Dependence: An Augmentation‐Substitution Framework

open access: yesPsychology &Marketing, Volume 43, Issue 7, Page 1675-1686, July 2026.
ABSTRACT Artificial intelligence has become consumers' primary decision‐making resource, raising two questions: how do consumers justify accepting AI as a trusted source of reasoning, and when does this acceptance maintain rather than forfeit their capacity to think independently?
Vasilis Theoharakis   +1 more
wiley   +1 more source

Impassibility, Omnisubjectivity, and Divine Eternality

open access: yes, 2022
In recent years, the debate over God's emotional life has reopened. The traditional view is that God is impassible, which explicitly entails that God does not have empathy towards creatures.
Mullins, Ryan
core   +1 more source

Epistemic authenticity

open access: yesNoûs, Volume 60, Issue 2, Page 413-432, June 2026.
Abstract There are better and worse ways to acquire epistemic virtues and more generally to be disposed to change or maintain one's epistemic dispositions over time. This is a dimension along which one might be better or worse as an epistemic agent that, we argue, cannot be explained with reference to current normative categories in epistemology but ...
Laura Frances Callahan, Michael C. Rea
wiley   +1 more source

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