Results 61 to 70 of about 245,473 (189)
Why Evidence Is Not Enough: Power, Politics, and a Strategy Shift for Public Health
The Milbank Quarterly, EarlyView.Policy Points Public health has lost political influence because of a mismatch between the forms of power primarily deployed in this field—knowledge and moral authority—and the forms of power that currently shape societal rules and health outcomes—economic, political, ideological, and physical.
JONATHAN C. HELLER
wiley +1 more source
Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Negotiations
, 2023 To encourage private negotiations for damages in antitrust cases some jurisdictions subtract a fraction of the redress from the fine. We analyze the effectiveness of this policy.
Lenhard, Severin, Emons, Winand
core +1 more source
Incidence, Risk, and Disclosure of Corporate Litigation: Insights from Federal Court Filings
Journal of Accounting Research, EarlyView.ABSTRACT We assemble and describe a sample of 174,782 lawsuits filed against 218,437 public‐company lawsuit‐defendants in federal district court from 2006 to 2021. These lawsuits involve an array of allegations, including product liability, civil rights discrimination, contract breaches, improper compensation and labor practices, antitrust violations ...
MARY BROOKE BILLINGS +3 more
wiley +1 more source
Network Structure and the Efficiency Gains from Mergers: Evidence from U.S. Freight Railroads
The RAND Journal of Economics, EarlyView.ABSTRACT The trade‐off between market power and efficiency gains is central to antitrust analyses of mergers, but empirical evidence quantifying efficiencies remains limited. Using transaction‐level data from U.S. freight railroads (1985–2005), this article quantifies merger‐induced cost efficiencies, driven mainly by eliminating inter‐railroad ...
Yanyou Chen
wiley +1 more source
The RAND Journal of Economics, EarlyView.ABSTRACT We study how insurer competition affects premiums for fully‐insured plans in the employer‐sponsored health insurance market. By utilizing quasi‐experimental variations induced by mergers among national insurers, we show that increased insurer concentration leads to higher premiums, but there exists substantial heterogeneity.
Haizhen Lin, Yaying Zhou
wiley +1 more source
Disclosure of Documents in Private Antitrust Enforcement Litigation [PDF]
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, 2015 Procedural tools aimed at access to information in general, and disclosure of documents in particular, are crucial for the effectiveness of private antitrust enforcement litigation and for facilitating more genuine equality of arms.
Aleš Galič
doaj +1 more source
The law of AI knowledge distillation
American Business Law Journal, EarlyView.Abstract Knowledge distillation—the practice of training a compact student model on the outputs of a larger teacher model—has emerged as the fastest‐growing technique for replicating and disseminating frontier artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities.
Taorui Guan
wiley +1 more source
The Directive 2014/104/UE on Antitrust Damages Actions: A critical review
Ars Iuris Salmanticensis, 2016 In November 2014, the Directive on antitrust damages actions became law in the EU.This Directive constitutes, undoubtedly, a major step forward in strengthening private enforcement. Indeed, it attempts to facilitate antitrust damages claims and to ensure
Vanessa JIMÉNEZ SERRANÍA
doaj
Development of Private Enforcement of Competition Law in Lithuania [PDF]
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, 2015 The article reviews the jurisprudence of Lithuanian courts on private enforcement of competition law and identifies the main obstacles for the development of this practice.
Raimundas Moisejevas
doaj
Collusion through debt and managers
Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, EarlyView.Abstract We investigate the anticompetitive effects of debt financing and managerial incentives in the presence of managers incurring personal bankruptcy costs. We characterize the strategic value for firms' shareholders of resorting to debt and managerial incentives as complementary devices to sustain collusion among firms, when managerial bankruptcy ...
Raffaele Fiocco +2 more
wiley +1 more source